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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah
corpora ti on,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
UNIONAMERICA, INC. , a corporation, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE,
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM
R. STEVENSON; PARK CITY RESERVATIONS, INC, a corpora ti on
dba SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F.
REED and GARY COLE,

Case No. 17359

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case in which Appellant seeks to recover from
Respondents $96, 000, an amount equal to a 6%· real estate listing
broker's commission based on the sale of real property at a purchase
price of $1,600,000, plus interest, punitive damages, attorneys' fees
and costs; and Respondent, Park City Reservations, Inc., seeks to
recover from Appellant $57,600 as a real estate selling broker's commission equal to 60% of said 6% commission, plus interest.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following a trial to the court without a jury, the Trial
Court awarded Appellant judgment against Unionamerica, Inc. for the
amount of $96,000 plus interest, but the Trial Court refused to award
Appellant any attorneys' fees or costs.

The Trial Court also awarded
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..
Park City Reservations, Inc. judgment against Appellant in the amov
of $57, 600 plus interest.

The Trial Court also awarded Appellant

judgment against Unionamerica, Inc. for the amount of a listing
broker's 6% commission in the separate sum of $2, 550 plus interest,
based on a separate sale transaction, but again refused to award
Appellant any attorneys' fees or costs.

The Trial Court also rulec

against Appellant and in favor of Respondents on other causes of
action pled as tort, and refused to award Appellant any punitive
damages.

This appeal contests only the following portions of the

Judgment:
1.

The portion of the of Judgment in favor of Park C:

Reservations, Inc. and against Appellant for the amountcl
selling broker's commission of $57,600, plus interest;
2.

The Trial Court's failure to award compensatory

damages against Park City Reservations, Inc. as an offset:
the portion of the Judgment in favor of Park City Reserva·
tions, Inc.;
3.

The Trial Court's failure to award compensatory

damages against all Respondents other than Park City Reser·
vations, Inc. in the amount of the portion of the Judgment
favor of Park City Reservations, Inc.;
4.

The Trial court's failure to award punitive damage

against all Respondents;
5.

The Trial court's failure to award Appellant its

attorneys' fees and costs against Unionamerica, Inc.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks:
1.

Reversal of that portion of the Judgment awarding Park

City Reservations, Inc. any amount from Appellant, and judgment in
Appellant's favor and against Park City Reservations, Inc., no cause
of action; or
2.

In the event that portion of the Judgment in favor of PCR

is affirmed on this appeal, an award of compensatory damages against
all Respondents, or any of them, in the amount of any such award in
favor of Park City Reservations, Inc.; and
3.

Remand of the case for the purpose of taking evidence to

determine the amount of punitive damages to which Appellant is entitled from all Respondents; and
4.

Remand of the case for the purpose of taking evidence to

determine the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to which Appellant
is entitled, including such attorneys fees and costs incurred with
respect to prosecuting this appeal; or in lieu of the relief sought in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above
5.

Remand of the case for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Transcript of Proceedings contained in the Record on
Appeal will be referred to herein by the letter "T." followed by the
number of the specific page or pages referred to.

Exhibits will be

referred to herein as "Ex." followed by the number of the specific
exhibit or exhibits referred to.

Two witnesses, whose testimony is

pertinent to this appeal, Robert Volk and Jack W. Davis, testified at
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trial by way of deposition which testimony by stipulation was not
transcribed as part of the Transcript of Proceedings.

Accor d'ingJ;

their testimony will be cited as "Volk Dep." and "Davi· s o ep. "
tively, followed by the page or pages referred to.
1.

res~

At all times pertinent hereto, Appellant was a Utah

t

poration in good standing having its principal place of busine~f
Sununi t County, Utah and was owned by its sole shareholder Harold 1
Taylor ("Taylor"), a plaintiff in the Trial Court but not a par~:
this appeal.

Taylor was a real estate broker licensed by the Stat:

Utah to conduct his business in the State of Utah, was the indirii
Utah licensed real estate broker acting for Appellant, and Appellr
was a corporate real estate broker duly licensed by the State ofl
to conduct its business in the State of Utah.

'11

1 and 2,

Tri~~

Findings; Ex. P-1, P-35, P-36, P-37 and P-38: T. 30, 31.
2.

su~

Respondent Unionamer ica, Inc. and its wholly owned

sidiary Respondent Ramshire, Inc. were foreign corporations qualifi:
to transact their businesses in the State of Utah, having their

pr!'

cipal place of business in the State of Utah in Sununit County.
William R. Stevenson ("Stevenson") was a vice-president of Ramshire,
Inc. and the authorized agent of Unionamerica, Inc. and Ramshire,
Inc.

1111 3, 4 and 6, Trial Court Findings.

Unionamerica, Inc. and

Ramshire, Inc. were one and the same entity for purposes of the subject lawsuit, which entity will be referred to herein as "Unionamerica."

T. 33.
3.

Respondent Park City Reservations, Inc.

("PCR") was a

Utah corporation having its principal place of business in Summit
county, Utah and was owned by its sole shareholder Respondent Harry
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lt Reed ("Reed").

n

5 and 7 I Trial Court Findings.

PCR "doing business

11: as Skyline Realty" was both a defendant and a counterclaimant in the
!S.•

Trial Court.
4.

1

t

Reed was a real estate broker licensed by the State of

utah to conduct his business in the State of Utah.

However, at all

times pertinent hereto, Reed was a branch broker for a sole proprietorship owned by Ladd E. Christensen ("Christensen"), an individual,
y: who did business under the assumed name of Skyline Realty and Invest~

ment co.

~

for such sole proprietorship.

lt

T. 630, 631.

Ut

suit, either in his own name or under any assumed name.

At all times pertinent hereto, Christensen was the broker

5.

Ct

Ex. P-45, P-46, P-47, P-48, P-49, P-50:

Christensen has never been a party to the subject law-

Christensen's company was a different company than PCR,

and at trial Reed could not produce nor did he know of any document
u~

that would establish that Reed at any time was ever a broker for PCR,

fr

the defendant and Counterclaimant in the subject lawsuit.
6.

ri·

e,

0·

T. 624, 637.

No one, including Reed was ever a broker for PCR and at

no time was PCR a corporate real estate broker licensed by the State
of Utah to conduct its business in the State of Utah.

Ex. P-34: T.

586.

7.

In July of 1978, after the subject transaction had been

completed, Reed as an individual doing business as Skyline Land
Company became his own real estate broker and was no longer a licensed
real estate salesman or broker/branch manager under Christensen.

Ex.

D-43, P-44, P-48, P-49, P-50, P-51: T. 633, 634.

B.

When the original complaint was filed and served, Reed

was named personally as a defendant doing business as Skyline Realty,
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r
I

and PCR was not made a party to the action.

Prior to the time a~~

the defendants had responded to the original Complaint, Stephen G,
Crockett ("Crockett"), as counsel for PCR, Reed and Cole,

teleph~~

cally advised counsel for Appellant that the name "Skyline Realty"
a "dba" for the corporation, PCR, rather than Reed, and Crockett

Wi

the~

suggested that an Amended Complaint be filed and served prior to any
defendants formally responding to the original Complaint.

Thereafter

prior to the time any of the defendants formally responded to the
original Complaint, and with the oral approval of counsel for all
defendants, counsel for Appellant caused the Amended Complaint to be
filed and served upon all defendants, including PCR, the new corporat•
defendant.

The naming of PCR as a

defendant was done in

respoMe~

Crockett's direct representations to counsel for Appellant that PCR
was the proper party in the case and was in fact the entity doing
business under the assumed name "Skyline Realty."

September 21, llH

Affidavit of Kent B Linebaugh in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For
Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint (the "September 21, 1979
Affidavit"); and H

1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the September 3, 1980 Affida·

vit of Kent B Linebaugh in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Order
Amending Findings of Fact, Making Additional Findings of Fact,
Amending Conclusions of Law, Adopting Additional Conclusions of Law
and Amending Judgment or in the Alternative, Granting a New Trial (the
"September 3, 1980 Affidavit").
9.

On November 30, 1978, Reed stated under oath: "I entH~

into an agreement with Harold w. Taylor wherein we were to split the
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commission on a 60-40 basis.

My company was to receive the 60% •

If 3 of Affidavit of Harry F. Reed in Opposition to Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiff.
10.

On December 8, 1978, counsel for Appellant took the

deposition of Reed at which time Reed testified that Skyline Realty
was a company he formed with the actual name being Park City Reservations, Inc., and that the name Skyline was an assumed named for PCR.
In his deposition, Reed further testified that PCR was the only corporation he had ever owned and that it was originally incorporated
under the name of Park City Reservations Inc.

Reed further testified

that for purposes of the subject lawsuit, the parties were only to be
concerned with the corporation PCR doing business as Skyline, and that
since November of 1976 he had only been doing business in the corporate form of Park City Reservations, Inc. doing business as Skyline.
11 7 of the September 3, 1980 Affidavit; pp. 7-10 of Reed's deposition.

11.

During the first week of January, 1980, during counsel

for Appellant's due diligence investigation of public records as part
of his preparation for the trial herein which began January 14, 1980,
said counsel first discovered PCR had not filed an assumed name certificate to conduct its business under the assumed name of Skyline
Realty, but that defendant Reed in his individual capacity had filed
an application to conduct his business under the assumed name of
line Land company."

0

Sky-

It was also at that same time that said counsel

first discovered that PCR had never been licensed as a corporate real
~state

broker.

Ex. P-34, P-51, P-52;

~

10 of the September 3, 1980

Affidavit.
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12.

By the time counsel for Appellant made the discoveries

as recited in the next preceding paragraph, trial of the above captioned matter was scheduled for less than 30 days hence, and said
counsel was accordingly prohibited by Rule 10 of the Supplemental
Rules Adopted by the Third Judicial District to Rules of Practice in
the District Courts of the State of Utah from moving to dismiss the
claims of PCR on either the ground that PCR was not a licensed corpo·
rate real estate broker or on the ground that PCR had not made appli·
cation for an assumed name certificate authorizing PCR to do businesi
under the assumed name of Skyline Realty.

Accordingly,

counsel fm

Appellant explained to the Trial Court the reasons why such facts haa
not been presented to the Trial Court in advance of trial.

Over

Respondents' objections to the contrary, the Trial Court expressly
held that counsel for Respondents were not surprised by Appellant's
evidence that PCR was not in fact a licensed corporate real estate
broker or that no assumed name certificate had been filed for PCR.
12 of the September 3, 1980 Affidavit; T. 640, 641.
13.

At trial, according to Reed and based upon the represen·

tat ions of Reed's counsel, for purposes of the subject lawsuit: Reed':
claims were really the claims of the corporation, PCR; PCR and Skylin'
Realty were one and the same corporation; and the names Skyline
Realty, Skyline Realty and Investment Company, Skyline Realty, Inc.,
Skyline Realty and Park City Reservations, Inc. were all different
names for the same corporate entity, PCR, which is the defendant and
counter claimant in the subject lawsuit.

T. 428, 429, 607, 623, 62 41

627, 628' 629.
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14.

Neither PCR, Reed and/or Cole ever filed an assumed name

certificate with the Secretary of State of the State of Utah to do
business under the assumed name of either Skyline Realty or Skyline
Realty and Investment Company.
15.

Ex. P-52; T. 638.

No Respondent presented or proferred any evidence that

any assumed name certificate had ever been filed on behalf of PCR to
enable PCR to do business under any assumed name.
16.

T. 650, 651.

The first and only time that Respondents ever claimed

that Appellant had waived any rights that Appellant had arising out of
PCR's failure to be licensed as a corporate real estate broker and/or
PCR's failure to file an assumed name certificate to do business under
the assumed name of Skyline Realty, was after the Respondents had
rested their cases and at the conclusion of the opening argument of
Appellant's counsel.
17.

T. 650, 653.

At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Gary Cole

("Cole") was a real estate salesman licensed by the State of Utah to
conduct his business in the State of Utah under Christensen as his
primary broker and under Reed as his broker/branch manager.
18.

Ex. P-46.

Prior to and on February 17, 1977, in the Summit County

District Court, Taylor had pending against Unionamerica and others a
lawsuit pursuant to which Taylor sought to recover damages for breach
of contract and certain torts.

One of the other defendants in that

previous lawsuit was Greater Park City
president was Ray Johnson ("Johnson").
party to the subject lawsuit.

Corporatio~

("GPCC") whose

Neither GPCC nor Johnson is a

On February 17, 1977, Taylor acting on

behalf of Appellant, Stevenson acting on behalf of Unionamerica and
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Johnson acting on behalf of GPCC, without the aid of counsel, negotiated, drafted, had typed, and signed an agreement settling the
aforesaid lawsuit (the "Settlement Agreement").

Pursuant to the

Settlement Agreement Unionamerica and GPCC severally agreed to enter

into 5 year exclusive listing agreements with Appellant with respect
to any Summit County real properties owned by either of them which
real properties they wished to sell.

11 9, Trial Court Findings,

Appendix C7 Ex. P-2, Appendix E.
19.

The Settlement Agreement required Appellant to perfun

the usual real estate broker activities incumbent upon a listing

broker transacting its business in Summit County, and Appellant per·

formed all services and discharged all obligations to be performed<
discharged by it pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

11 2, Memorar

dum Decision, Appendix B1 11 1, Trial Court Conclusions, Appendix C.
20.

The Settlement Agreement also required Unionamerica ar

GPCC to pay to Appellant a 6% commission on all of their respective

Summit County real properties sold during the aforesaid 5 year peric
and at the same time required Appellant to split said 6% commission
with a selling broker, with 60% of said commission going to such
selling broker and 40% of such commission being retained by Appellar
as the listing broker.
P-2, Appendix E.

,I 9, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; Ex.

Said provision in the Settlement Agreement requiri

Appellant and any such selling brokers to split the 6% commissions
will be referred to herein as the "60-40 Provision."
21.

While the real estate brokers in Park City had not

entered into any written multiple listing agreement, at all times
pertinent hereto the real estate industry in such area, in custom an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

practice,

had a multiple listing arrangement which according to Reed

was referred to as the "Park City Multiple," and which Reed characterized as a "casual multiple listing service."

Reed personally

participated in organizing the Park City Multiple and, according to
Reed, pursuant thereto the participating brokers would exchange
notices of listings weekly and split sales commissions with 60% of the
commissions going to the selling brokers and 40% of the commissions
going to the listing brokers.
22.

T. 433, 478-480, 486, 490, 491, 507-508.

Although the Park City Multiple was not in writing, Reed

personally felt bound by its customs and practices.

Reed and other

Park City Brokers, including Appellant and Taylor, participated in the
Park City Multiple, and both Reed and Appellant had exchanged notices
of listings and had split commissions between them in 20-30 transactions over a period of several years.

Ex. P-13,

P-29~

T. 441, 442,

479-491, 516.
23.

According to Stevenson, at the time the 60-40 Provision

was agreed to, Stevenson also knew how the Park City Multiple worked,
including the fact that it was the custom and practice under the Park
City Multiple for a selling broker and a listing broker to split the
commissions on a 60%-40% basis.
24.

T. 283, 291, 292.

Also on February 17, 1977, shortly after entering into

the Settlement Agreement that same day, and pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement, Appellant and Unionamerica entered into a written vacant
property exclusive listing (the "Listing") pursuant to which Listing
Unionamerica listed for sale with Appellant as the listing broker
approximately 10.5 acres of real property (the "Village Land") owned
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by Unionamerica and located in Summit County.

,, 10, Trial court

Findings, Apendix C; Ex. P-3, Appendix F.
25.

Even though Unionamerica had entered into the Listi~

calling for a purchase price of $1,685,000 for the Village Land, a~
Appellant began working on a sale at that price, Stevenson was not
willing to have Unionamerica sell the Village Land at that price but
didn't disclose such fact to Appellant.
26.

T. 382, 383.

Prior to the sale of the Village Land pursuant to the

subject sale, Dempsey Construction Company ("Dempsey") through Appel·
lant indicated a definite interest in purchasing the Village Land.
Although Stevenson knew of Dempsey's interest and that Dempsey was
soliciting a counteroffer from Unionamerica, Stevenson still did not
properly respond to Dempsey's overtures as a result of which he was
severely reprimanded by his boss at Unionamerica.

Ex. P-3; T. 306,

310.

27.

On February 26, 1979, PCR, Reed and Cole moved for par·

tial summary judgment herein.

Judge Bryant H. Croft denied said

motion, but with respect to the legal effect of the Settlement Agree·
ment and the Listing, Judge Croft held as follows:
The court finds that the Settlement Agreement and
the Listing Agreement contemplate that other
parties not involved in the lawsuit might find
buyers for the listed properties and negotiate a
sale therefor, and that neither agreement contains
any express or implied provision that Unionamerica
or Ramshire would direct any "walk in buyer" to
plaintiffs. Such issues are thus now resolved for
all future proceedings in this case.
Judge Croft's Order, Appendix A.

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28.
order.

The Trial Court considered itself bound by Judge croft's

,, 3, Memorandum Decision, Appendix B: 11 4, Trial Court Con-

clusions, Appendix C: T. 567.
29.

For purposes of this case the parties stipulated that

the term "walk-in" is understood to be a potential buyer who comes to
the owner unsolicited and not referred to the owner by a licensed real
estate agent, and the term will have that meaning when used herein.
T.

201.
30.

In custom and practice, upon Appellant and Unionamerica

entering into both the Settlement Agreement and the Listing, all
licensed brokers became eligible to become a selling broker with
respect to the Village Land.
31.

T. 552, 556-558.

Although the Settlement Agreement required Unionamerica

to enter into an "exclusive listing agreement" with Appellant, the
Settlement Agreement did not specify the details of such listing.
Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of Utah, there are
two types of exclusive listing agreements in use, which types are
known as either an exclusive right to sell listing, or an exclusive
agency listing.

Pursuant to the same custom and practice under an

exclusive right to sell listing, the owner cannot sell the property
himself and avoid paying the agreed upon commission, while under the
exclusive agency listing the owner can sell the property himself and
avoid paying the agreed upon commission.

T. 39, 40, 42, 126, 127,

172, 546-549.

32.

Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of

Utah, and according to Reed, the Listing constituted what is known as
an exclusive right to sell listing, and was in the standard exclusive
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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right to sell listing form generally in use in the State of Utah in
general, and by Reed in particular, at all times pertinent hereto.
Ex. P-3, Appendix E, P-33; T. 45, 439, 448, 548, 549.
33.

Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of

Utah, and according to Reed, there is no inconsistency between t~

60-40 Provision and an exclusive right to sell listing in the fo~~
the Listing.

Ex. P-2, Appendix D, P-3, Appendix E, P-33; T. 436,

553-555.
34.

According to Stevenson there was nothing in the Settle·

ment Agreement or the Listing intended to be inconsistent with

granting Appellant an exclusive right to sell listing with respect t:
the Village Land, because:
a.

Prior to signing the Settlement Agreement and the

Listing, even though Unionamerica wanted to sell the Villag1
Land, Stevenson hadn't wanted Unionamerica to list

the~~

lage Land with any broker because he wanted every licensed
broker to be eligible to earn a full 6% commission, and he
understood that once the Listing was given, Appellant wou!O
be the only broker eligible for the full amount of such co1·
mission, and the most a selling broker could earn would be
60% of such commission.
b.

T. 285, 286, 292, 328, 359.

Stevenson did not read the language in the listin~

which provides nr hereby grant you for the period of five
years from date hereof the exclusive right to sell or
exchange said property or any part thereof at the price~
terms stated hereon or such other price or term to whiclV
may agree in writing." until after the subject sale had bee
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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consummated and a 6% commission had been earned, but Stevenson nevertheless intended that Unionamerica be bound by the
Listing.
c.

T. 303, 304.
The 60-40 Provision was Stevenson's idea and he

insisted on its inclusion in the Settlement Agreement, but
the Settlement Agreement in general and the 60-40 Provision
in particular are both silent on the subject of a walk-in,
and nothing in the Settlement Agreement had anything to do
with whether a walk-in would be referred.
d.

T. 291, 305.

Prior to the signing of the Settlement Agreement it

was orally agreed between Appellant and GPCC, that GPCC would
refer any GPCC walk-in to Appellant, but if another broker
"originated" the sale, then the 60-4G Provision would require
Appellant and such other broker to split a 6% commission.

T.

202, 203, 210, 229.
e.

Such oral agreement was reached at the time of the

signing of the Settlement Agreement when GPCC had Summit
County properties it had not decided to sell, and with
respect to which it did not give a listing that day, while
Unionamerica was listing substantially all of its Summit
County property with Appellant on the date of the Settlement
Agreement, and therefore Unionamerica was not a party to the
oral agreement with respect to a walk-in because Stevenson
understood that the Listing as given to Appellant that same
day protected Appellant with respect to the subject of the
Appellant-GPCC oral agreement.

T. 295, 300, 380, 381.
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35.

Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of

Utah, the listing broker has an advantage over a potential selling
broker with respect to any property about which they exchange notice!
of listing or split commissions.
a.

These advantages include:

The fact that the listing broker may put signs ~

the property with the listing broker's name, address and
telephone number,

while potential selling brokers are not

permitted to put signs on any property listed with another
broker.
b.

Usually the listing broker has better access to~

owner and the information helpful in making the sale because
the owner has in fact selected the listing broker as his
direct agent.
c.

Under an exclusive right to sell listing the listini•

broker through the owner has access to any referrals from
owner.
36.

t~!

T. 176, 177.

Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of

Utah, certain advantages are inherent to both the listing broker and 1
selling broker in the use of an exclusive right to sell listing in
conjunction with a multiple listing arrangement.

Such advantages

include:
a.

The selling broker becomes an agent of the listing

broker and a sub-agent of tpe owner, and through the listing
broker a selling broker has access to the money or other
consider at ion the owner receives when the sale is completed.
b.

The listing broker gets paid for his promotional

efforts, even though a selling broker consummates the sale.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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c.

The owner, as a result of the exclusive right to

sell listing, is required to refer a walk-in to the listing
broker.
d.

The listing broker can control the transaction or be

what is called "a captain of the deal."

As such the listing

broker is designated by the owner as the owner's representative in the transaction, who looks out for the owner's
interest, monitors the conduct of all of the potential
selling brokers, and usually reviews any earnest money agreement or offer which is presented, all in such a way that the
potential selling brokers work through the listing broker.
T. 127, 128, 563, 564.
37.

Pursuant to the custom and.practice in the State of

Utah, under an exclusive right to sell listing, if none of the potential selling brokers rises to the level of being the procuring cause
of the sale in question, the listing broker is entitled to keep all of

any commission earned.
38.

T. 561.

On May 15, 1978, a portion of the Village Land was con-

veyed by Unionamerica to Jack

w.

Davis, Inc., a corporation (the

"Buyer") which corporation was wholly owned by its president Jack W.
Davis ("Davis") and his family.

As a result of such conveyance, there

then became due and owing from Unionamerica to Appellant a sales
commission of 6% of the $1,600,000 purchase price or $96,000 (the
"Commission").

11 26, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C1 Davis Dep. 8,

36; see also the averments of ~ 13 of the Fourth Amended Complaint

which averments were admitted by Unionamerica.
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39.

Appellant performed all services and discharged all

obligations to be performed and discharged by it pursuant to the
Listing.

~ 2, Memorandum Decision, Appendix B; ,I 1, Trial Court Co;.

clusions, Appendix
40.

c.

Before the Trial Court, Unionamerica and Stevenson cor·

ceded that Unionamerica rather than PCR had "found" the Buyer with
respect to the subject sale.
41.

T. 14, 18.

Before the Trial Court, PCR, Reed and Cole conceded~

PCR, Reed and Cole were involved in the transaction as representati:o
of the Buyer rather than acting for Unionamerica, which concession·•
confirmed by Davis who testified that he wanted Reed to represent hi
interests in Park City.

,I 22, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T.

22; Davis Dep. 51.
42.

That PCR, Reed or Cole did not "find," "originate,"

"procure," or otherwise act as the agents of Appellant or sub-agent;
of Unionamer ica with respect to the subject sale, is further confir:'
by the following facts based upon the testimony of Stevenson,
Cole, Davis (who was very antagonistic to Taylor.

Re~,

T. 259) and/or

Robert Volk ("Volk") , the latter being the president and chief execc·
tive officer of Unionamerica, Inc., a lawyer and former Commissione;
of Corporations of the State of California:
a.

Sometime between September 1 and October 1, 1977

t

first mention to the Buyer of the Village Land was made whe
Gordon Luce ("Luce") , a member of the board of di rectors of
Unionamerica, Inc., first told Davis about the Village Lani
and its availability for purchase.

Such mention was made

during a face to face meeting between Luce and Davis at Lai
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-Tahoe, California, at which time Luce was well acquainted
with Davis and already knew of Davis' credit worthiness
because Luce managed a bank in San Diego, California, in
which area Davis resided, and which bank financed some of
Davis' business ventures.

T. 88; Volk Dep. 18, 24; Davis

Dep. 14.
b.

Sometime between September 1 and October 1, 1977,

Volk spoke with Davis by telephone at whi_ch time Davis told
Volk he was interested in purchasing the Village Land.

' 13,

Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; Volk Dep. 19, 21; Davis
Dep. 15.
c.

Approximately two weeks prior to October 3, 1977,

Stevenson learned from Volk about Davis' interest in the
Village Land, but at that time Stevenson did not know Davis
by name.

~

14, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 321;

Volk Dep. 20, 21.
d.

Sometime during that same period, Unionamerica sent

Davis a feasibility study with respect to the future development and anticipated economic returns on the Village Land
(the "Feasibility Study"), which Feasibility Study disclosed
Unionamerica's asking price for the Village Land of
$1,600,000.
e.

Ex. P-5; Davis Dep. 18, 19.

Shortly before October 3, 1977, Volk and Davis

agreed by telephone to meet in Park City to inspect the Village Land and discuss the Buyer's purchase thereof.
Dep. 19, 22; Davis Dep. 15.
-19-
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Volk

f.

On the morning of October 3, 1977 Volk ordered

Stevenson to travel from Los Angeles, California to meet wi·.
Volk and Davis and Davis' wife in Park City to discuss t~
subject sale and show Davis the Village Land.

~ 14, Tri~

Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 323.
g.

Thereafter that same morning, Stevenson called the

offices of Appellant and asked for Taylor, whereupon he was
told by Appellant's personnel that Taylor was in San Francisco, California and would not be back until later
week.

int~

During that same telephone conversation, Stevenson"'

asked whether he would like to be put in touch with Taylor:
San Francisco, but Stevenson declined such accommodation. :.
the time of that same telephone conversation, Appellant had
four

licensed real estate salesmen in Park City, but

dur~

such telephone conversation Stevenson did not ask to speak
with any such salesmen about selling the Village Land even
though he was personally acquainted with one of them.

T.

180' 187' 190-193' 324' 325.

h.

On the evening of October 3, 1977, Volk and Steven·

son met at the Salt Lake City Airport whereupon Volk told
Stevenson that Volk had to go to Los Angeles and that Stever
son should go ahead and meet with Davis and Davis' wife as
planned.

~ 15, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 325,

326; Volk Dep. 22.

i.

At the time Volk left Stevenson in Salt Lake CiU

that evening, Stevenson knew that the involvement of a
selling broker other than Appellant in a sale of the Villa9
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Land would obligate Appellant to split the Commission with
such selling broker.

Notwithstanding that fact, at no time

after the morning of October 3, 1977 and prior to the execution on October 17, 1977 of the subject Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase (the "Earnest Money Agreement"), did
Stevenson attempt to involve Appellant in the sale of the
Village Land to the Buyer.
j.

T. 328-333.

Prior to February 17, 1977 Unionamerica had listed

certain of its real properties for sale with Reed as the
listing broker, and prior to February 17, 1977 and at all
times pertinent hereto Stevenson, Reed and Cole were close
personal friends.
k.

T. 280, 281, 429.

At all times pertinent hereto, PCR, Reed and Cole

did not know the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the
Listing, but did know that Appellant and Unionamerica had
been in a lawsuit and as a result of that lawsuit Unionamerica had listed the Village Land for sale with Appellant.
~I

12, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 320, 340, 453.
1.

At the time Reed knew the Village Land had been

listed to Appellant, the standard form in use in Park City
was in the same form as the Listing, and at that same time
Cole did not know of any form of listing other than the standard form listing granting an exclusive right to sell.

T.

394-397, 439, 448.
m.

Shortly after Appellant entered into the Settlement

Agreement and the Listing, and several months prior to
October 3, 1977, Taylor contacted Reed and requested the
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assistance of Reed in selling the Village Land with the
understanding that should PCR be the selling broker, PCR
would be entitled to receive 60% of the Commission and 401 .
the Commission would be retained by Appellant as the listin:
broker.
n.

~

12, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C.

As soon as Volk left Stevenson at the conclusion c'

their airport meeting the evening of October 3, 1977, Steve·
son took the lead in the anticipated transaction, and in
spite of Cole's inexperience in real estate, he called Col!
by telephone and arranged a face to face meeting with Reed
and Cole at Cole's home that same evening.

Stevenson thu

traveled to Park City where he met with Reed and Cole at
Cole's home, which meeting lasted from 10 to 15 minutes anc
during which meeting Stevenson told Reed and Cole the

ru~

that he was in town was to meet with Davis concerning Davi:
interest in purchasing the Village Land.

During that

s~e

conversation, Stevenson told Reed and Cole that he had tri!
to reach Taylor with respect to the tr ans action, but Taylor
was out of town.

~ 18, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; '.

326, 327, 339, 340, 370, 393, 398, 452, 453; Volk Dep. 37,

o.

At no time after Reed and Cole learned of the pro:·

pecti ve sale to the Buyer and that Taylor was out of town,
did Cole attempt to cont~ct Taylor or any other personnel~
Appellant, nor did Reed or Cole attempt to otherwise
ascertain the details of the provisions of the Settlement
Agreement or the Listing.

T. 398-402, 409, 410.
-22-
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P·

Later that night of October 3, 1977, Stevenson met

with Davis in Park City for 2 to 3 hours and the two of them
discussed Park City in general and the Village Land and the
Feasiblity Study in particular.

Thereafter that same night,

Stevenson arranged to have Reed and Cole meet with Stevenson
and Davis and Davis' wife the following morning for breakfast.

~

q.

16, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 341, 372.
On October 4, 1977, such breakfast meeting occurred

and was the first time Reed or Cole or any other agent or
employee of PCR had met or had any involvement with Davis or
the Buyer.

Prior to this first involvement between Reed,

Cole and Davis, Davis had already read the Feasibility
Study.

At such

breakfast meeting, there was a general dis-

cussion about the merits of Park City and Davis' interest in
the Village Land.

~

19, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T.

402, 458; Davis Dep. 25-30.
r.

After such breakfast meeting, Davis, Davis' wife,

Stevenson, Reed and Cole toured Park City together and ended
the tour by viewing the Village Land on the afternoon of
October 4, 1977, having further discussed the merits of Park
City and the Village land.

~

19, Trial Court Findings,

Appendix C; Davis Dep. 30-32.
s.

Later that same afternoon, after Reed and Cole had

left the group, Davis indicated to Stevenson the Buyer's
definite interest in purchasing the Village Land.

The sale

to the Buyer was virtually made by then because by that time
Davis was committ~d to purchasing the property and so far as
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he was concerned it was an easy sale to make.

T. 343; Davi;

Dep. 74, 75.
A few days after October 4, 1977, Davis called v01 ,

t.

on the telephone and orally agreed to the Buyer

purchasi~

the Village Land at Unionamer ica' s asking pr ice, and Volk
felt good about the Buyer's ability to purchase because of
Luce's recommendation of Davis.

After such telephone conver

sation, Volk ordered Stevenson to follow through to make sur
that the sale of the Village Land to the Buyer was consummated.

According to Volk, Volk "solicited Jack Davis into

this company, by reason of my conversations with Gordon
Luce."

Volk Dep. 23-26, 35.

u.

On October 8, 1977, Cole wrote and mailed a lettn

to Appellant purportedly to put Appellant on notice that
Cole, representing PCR, had shown the Village Land to Davis
and Davis' wife, which letter was received by Appellant wW
in a few days after October 8, 1977.

Nothing in this lett:

disclosed to Appellant that Davis had been directed to PCR i
Appellant's principal, Unionamerica.

Ex. P-26; T. 66, 79,

403, 404.

v.

On October 15, 1977, Reed sought out Taylor in Pui

City and told Taylor that Reed had a buyer interested in
purchasing the Village Land.

Reed asked Taylor to orallY
. 'c·

confirm that there would be a 60%-40% split of the Comm1s 51
if such a sale occurred, and Taylor gave such confirmati~·

In spite of the fact that Taylor and Reed were both liceM~
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real estate brokers at the time, at no time during this October 15 meeting did Reed tell Taylor that Davis and the Buyer
had been referred to Cole, Reed and PCR by Appellant's principal, Unionamerica.
T.

~I

23, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C;

81, 88 I 462 I 464.
w.

On the morning of October 17, 1977, Reed and Cole

met with Davis in San Diego, California at Davis' telephonic
invitation and the three of them drafted the Earnest Money
Agreement.

x.

Ex. P-9, D-27; Davis Dep. 33, 45, 46.

That same morning, after drafting the Earnest Money

Agreement, Reed called Stevenson in Los Angeles, California
and after 5 minutes conversation Stevenson told Reed that
Unionamerica would accept the Earnest Money Agreement as
drafted.

This was the first time Stevenson and Unionamerica

had considered a sale of the Village Land pursuant to provisions similar to the provisions of the Earnest Money Agreement.

T.

y.

88, 332, 333, 345.
That same morning Davis signed the Earnest Money

Agreement on behalf of the Buyer and the Buyer paid the
earnest money deposit required, whereupon Reed and Cole flew
the Earnest Money Agreement to Los Angeles where Stevenson
signed the Earnest Money Agreement on behalf of Unionamerica
on the afternoon of October 17, 1977.

~

21, Trial Court

Findings, Appendix C; Ex. P-9, D-27; T. 346, 347, 466.
z.

on October 19, 1977, Reed personally delivered the

fully executed Earnest Money Agreement to Taylor in Park
City, whereupon Taylor asked Reed where PCR had found the
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Buyer.

According to Reed, he then did a "dumb" and "ridic·;.

lous" thing, by intentionally misleading Taylor by stati~
implying that the Buyer had been found as a result of skii:
in Park City.

Such statement or implication was not tr~.

Ex. P-17; T. 87, 98, 110, 463, 468-470.
aa.

On October 19 or 20, 1977 Reed told Cole that Ree'

had intentionally misled Taylor about where Cole had fou~
the Buyer, but Cole did not take any action to tell Ta~ru
that the true source of the Buyer was Appellant's principa:.
Unionamerica.
bb.

T. 415, 417.

Just prior to October 24, 1977, Stevenson, Davis,

Reed and Cole met in Salt Lake City to war k out the details
of a written real estate agreement pursuant to which Uniomamer i ca would sell the Village Land to the Buyer.

Davis De:

47, 48.
cc.

On October 24, 1977 Appellant notified all Respon·

dents of Appellant's contention that Appellant was entitled
to 100% of the Commission based upon Appellant's position
that the Buyer had been referred by Unionamerica to Reed,
Cole and PCR.
43.

Ex. P-10; T. 90.

As of October 26, 1977, Unionamerica and the Buyer

entered into a written real estate agreement (the "Real Estate

A~&

ment") pursuant to which the Village Land was sold to the Buyer Ml
15, 1978 as aforesaid.

Ex. P-12; T. 376; see also the averments cll

13 of the Fourth Amended Complaint, which averments were admitted by
Unionamerica.
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44.

Prior to June 10, 1977, Both Reed and Cole were involved

in the preparation of the Feasibility Study and were aware of the
future development and marketing possibilities of the Village Land
over three months prior to meeting Davis.
45.

Ex. P-5; T. 317-319.

Not only were Reed and Cole brought into the subject

transaction to represent the interests of Davis and the Buyer, but
such representation continued to the date of trial inasmuch as at that
time: Reed was Davis' broker with respect to marketing the 144 condominium units that had been or were in the process of being constructed
on the Village Land; Reed and Cole were each given 5% of the profit
from the development and sale of such condominiums; and Cole became an
employee of the limited partnership which developed and was marketing
such condominiums, and acted as a salesman of such condominiums.

,

25, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; Ex. P-24; Davis Dep. 61-65.

46.

At the time Reed first met Davis, Reed wanted Davis for

a client regardless of whether PCR earned a selling broker's commis-

sion based upon the sale of the Village Land to the Buyer, and Reed
eventually got Davis as a client for Davis' future transactions in
Park City.

T.

47.

456, 618.
At all times pertinent hereto Appellant consistently

took the position that Unionamerica owed Appellant 100% of the Commission.

Ex. P-10, P-14; T. 90, 100-103, 473, 612.
48.

Prior to the suit being instituted, Unionamerica con-

ceded that its failure to pay 100% of the Commission to Appellant
would constitute a breach of the Listing.
49.

Ex. P-13.

Unionamerica, Stevenson, PCR and Reed consistently con-

ceded that Appellant was entitled to at least 40% of the Commission,
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and at no time prior to suit being instituted herein did any Res~~
dent ever contend that Appellant was not entitled to at least 40%~
the Commission.

Ex. P-12, P-13, P-17, P-32; T. 94, 104, llO, 350,

351, 419, 583, 584.

SO.

Notwithstanding the foregoing conssessions, upon the

Commission being earned and in response to Unionamerica' s inquiry,
Reed refused to agree to Unionamer ica paying even 40% of the Commission to Appellant because in Reed's words, "that wouldn't be very
smart," because Appellant would "have nothing he could gain by ever
settling

II

51.

T.

477, 478.

The Earnest Money Agreement provides at lines 49 and 1:

as follows:
The seller agrees in consideration of the efforts
of the agent in procuring a purchaser to pay said
agent a commission of 6% of the sale price. In
the event seller has entered into a listing contract with any other agent and said contract is
presently effective, this paragraph will be of no
force or effect.

,I

20, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; Ex. P-9, D-27.
52.

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions and Appellant'

demands to the contrary, upon the Commission being earned counsel for
Unionamerica insisted on Unionamerica not paying any of the Commissic
directly to Appellant, and Unionamer ica took such position in spite c
the custom and practice in the State of Utah that a split of any Corn·
mission does not involve the owner but is solely an issue between thi
listing broker and the selling broker.
53.

T. 418, 570, 571.

On May 17, 1978 Unionamerica deposited the Commission:·

escrow with Summit County Title Company (the "Escrow Holder").
Trial Court Findings, Appendix C.
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,I

26 ·

54.

The Listing required Unionamerica to pay to Appellant

reasonable attorneys' fees and all costs of collection as a result of
unionamerica's failure to pay the Commission to Appellant, and Appellant incurred reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of collection in an
amount not determined by the Trial Court.

~

1, Judgment, Appendix D;

EX P-3.

55.

On June 23, 1978, Unionamerica without the assitance of

a real estate broker sold certain of its real property located in
summit County (the "Davis Property") to Davis for a total purchase
price of $42,500, and pursuant to the Settlement Agreement on that
date there became due and owing to Appellant from Unionamerica a sales
commission of 6% of said purchase price or $2,550.
Decision, Appendix B;

~

~

5, Memorandum

29, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; t 7,

Trial Court Conclusions, Appendix C.
56.

Unionamerica failed to notify Appellant of its intention

to sell the Davis Property and failed to enter into an exclusive
listing agreement with Appellant
~

Agreement.
57.

as contemplated by the Settlement

5, Memorandum Decision; Ex. P-16; T. 112, 113.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Settlement Agreement

and the contemplated written exclusive listing agreement with respect
to the Davis Property, Appellant is entitled to recover from Unionamerica Appellant's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of collection
incurred with respect to collecting the $2,550 due and owing to Appellant, but the reasonable amount of said attorneys' fees and costs of
collection were not determined by the Trial Court.

! 5, Memorandum

Decision, Appendix B; ~ 1, Judgment, Appendix D; Ex. P-2, Appendix E,
P-3,

Appendix F.
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58.

Volk never saw either the Settlement Agreement or the

Listing prior to the time his deposition was taken on November

a,

1979, which was nearly three years after such written instruments~
been entered into, and nearly a year and one-half after the subject
lawsuit had been started.

Until after the lawsuit was started, Vo!i

didn't even know such agreements existed, except he did have a vague
understanding that the previous lawsuit had been settled.
found out that Taylor was making some claim based upon such
ments, he was shocked.
59.

When Vo!i
agre~

Volk Dep. 9, 10, 28-30.

Notwithstanding the fact that Volk knew nothing

a~~

the Settlement Agreement and the Listing until after the suit was
started, and notwithstanding the fact that Volk never even looked at
the language of the Settlement Agreement or the Listing until

ne~~·

year and one-half after the suit was started, when told by Stevenson
that the suit had been started, Volk's reaction was "well to hell
Mr. Taylor," or words to that effect.
60.

wi·.

Volk Dep. 32, 33.

The Trial Court refused to admit into evidence the~

spring 1979 issue of Volume 3 of "Utah Real Estate News," the officio
publication of the Real Estate Division of the Department of Businei

0

Regulations of the State of Utah, which issue in an article entitlec
"Listing and Selling Brokers' Relationship" on page 2 thereof (t~
"Real Estate Division Article") according to the director of the Rea:
Estate Division described Utah real estate industry customs and prac·
tices as to the rights and duties between listing and selling broke!'
and which description had been approved by the state's Board of Real
Estate Examiners.

The customs and practices described in the Real
-30-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Estate Division Article were in effect at all times pertinent to this
iawsuit.

Ex. P-30; T. 520-529.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PCR A SELLING BROKER'S
COMMISSION.
A. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT PCR WAS
THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SUBJECT SALE.

•I

1.

'i

The Trial Court's determination.

The Memorandum Decision is silent with respect to any specific finding or conclusion on the issue of whether PCR was the procuring
cause of the subject sale.
Appendix

However, at ' 27, Trial Court Findings,

c, it is said that PCR "by and through its agents, Reed and

Cole, fully performed the obligations of a selling broker under the
fee splitting agreement reached between plaintiffs" and PCR.

That is

as close as the Trial Court came to revealing any criteria by which
PCR's sales efforts were measured.

On the other hand, Judge Croft's

Order held that a person or entity other than Appellant or Unionamerica would be entitled to a split of the Commission if such other
person or entity were to both "find" and "negotiate" a sale of the
property.

Judge Croft's Order further held that it was to be the law

of the case on such issue.
2.

See Judge Croft's Order, Appendix A.

The law and its application to the uncontroverted facts.

Appellant contends that the evidence in the record precludes
a11 reasonable basis in fact which can reasonably support the Trial

Court's decision.
:l
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I

i•I

An understanding of the type of listing given Appellant, it,
use in conjunction with a multiple listing arrangement and the
resulting relationships between Appellant, Unionamerica and PCR, is

important to our discussion of whether PCR was the procuring cauh~
the subject sale.
Pursuant to the Listing, Unionamerica agreed as follows:
In consideration of your agreement to list the
property described above, and to use reasonable
efforts to find a purchaser therefor, I hereby
grant you for the period of five years from date
hereof the exclusive right to sell or exchange
said propety or any part thereof . . . .
If said property or any part thereof is sold or
exchanged during said term by myself or any other
person, firm or corporation, I agree to pay you a
commission . . .
(emphasis added)
It is elementary that the Listing is of a type known as M
"exclusive right to sell listing."

See

~~

31 - 34, Statement of

Facts; 88 A.L.R.2d 936 § 10; 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers §§ 226, 227; Folz
v. Begnoche, 222 Ka. 383, 565 P.2d 592 (1977); Carlsen v. Zane, 67
Cal. Rptr. 747 (1968); Patterson v. Blair, 123 Utah 216, 257 P.2d
(1953).

9~1

Although Appellant agreed to allow other brokers to partici·

pate and share in the Commission, this did not in any way abrogate tt
exclusive right to sell granted by the Listing.

Rather, the 60-40

Provision was dependent upon and could become operative only through
the Listing as such other brokers became agents of Appellant and n~
agents of Unionamerica.

By guaranteeing to Appellant as the listing

broker a portion of the Commission, Appellant was protected as to th'
portion of the Commission corresponding to the effort necessary to
obtain the Listing and perform the duties of a listing broker.

The

remaining effort required to accomplish the purpose of the Settlemen
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J•

1

n'

Agreement and the Listing, that being the procurement of a buyer, was
to be compensated by that portion of the Commission reserved for a
selling broker, and all licensed brokers could compete for such portion.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and the Listing, and the

custom and practice in the real estate industry, if Appellant or
unionamerica procured the sale, then Appellant would be entitled to
retain all of the Commission.
P.2d 978

See White v. Ragel, 82 N.M. 644, 485

(1971); Carlsen v. Zane, 67 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1968).
Because of the "exclusive" nature of the Listing, to earn the

60% portion of the Commission, it is well settled that PCR had to act

as an agent of Appellant and as a sub-agent of Unionamerica.

See 45

A.L.R.3d 190; Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wa.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); 71
A.L.R. 3d 586

§

21 et. seq.

An excellent discussion of this same proposition and the
duties and obligations of listing and selling brokers with respect to
each other may be found in the Real Estate Division Article as published and approved by the Utah Board of Real Estate Examiners as
follows:
The selling broker, as the sub-agent of the
listing broker, is an agent of two principals the listing broker, who is his immediate principal, and the listing broker's principal. As a
sub-agent, the selling broker owes an agent's duty
to both of his principals, and that duty is one of
utmost loyalty. This duty requires the selling
broker to exercise good faith, professional skill,
and diligence pursuant to the listing broker's
instructions as each fulfills his respective obligations to their mutual principal. This duty
further requires the selling broker to disclose
immediately to the listing broker all ~aterial and
pertinent facts which concern transactions on
behalf of their principal. This duty does not
terminate upon the execution of a contract, but
continues until the termination of the sub-agency.
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The selling broker's failure to discharge this
duty to his principals would be a breach of the
fiduciary relationship, which in turn would subject him to liability for any harm which befalls
the listing broker or the principal by reason of
the breach. Since the listing broker is the only
party with full knowledge of the seller's instructions and the seller's needs, it is imperative
that the selling broker follow the instructions of
the listing broker at all times, and to immediately inform the listing broker of all material and
pertinent facts which concern the transaction.
Generally, it is assumed that the agreement
between listing broker (principal) and selling
broker (agent), subject to any agreement to the
contrary, requires the listing broker to pay the
selling broker, in the event the selling broker is
the procuring cause to a sale, provided the sale
is consummated and/or a commission is paid to the
listing broker. Any claim for an earned commission by the selling broker should be made against
the listing broker.
Page 2, Ex. P-30, which exhibit the Trial Court did not admit

in~

evidence.
As the foregoing makes clear, whether PCR is entitled to
collect a portion of the Commission from Appellant depends on whethe1
PCR was the procuring cause of the sale to the Buyer.

To make that

decision we are concerned with how procuring cause is determined.
survey of the various jurisdictions, including Utah, reveals four
different tests utilized by the courts to determine what constitutes
procuring cause:
a.

Finding the Purchaser.

Our Supreme Court in Frederick May v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40,
368 P.2d 266 (1962), in the process of holding that the broker hadnc
exclusive right to sell listing with respect to the sale of corporate
stock, held that entitlement to a brokerage commission depended on
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i

whether the broker was the "procuring cause" of the sale.

It was

there said:
The cases use many different words in conjunction
with, or in place of, the words, "procuring cause"
to indicate the necessary extent the broker must
induce the sale in order to be entitled to a commission, such as "proximate cause," "actuating
cause," "moving cause" and the like: all meaning
about the same thing. However, the extent to
which the broker's efforts must induce the sale
depends on the terms used in the contract and the
understanding and intention of the parties in
making such agreement and the facts and circumstances of the case. Usually, whether the broker
first approaches, or brings to the attention of
the buyer that the property is for sale, or brings
the bu er into the icture, has considerable
weight in determining whether the buyer sic] is
the procuring cause of the sale. (emphasis added)
Other courts have used synonymous language in applying or describing
this test, to-wit:
"procuring cause" refers to efforts of a realtor
in introducing, producing, finding or interesting
a purchaser • • • • (emphasis added). Harkey v.
Gahagan, 338 So.2d 133, La. App.2d Cir. (1976).
To be the "procuring cause" of a sale of real
estate, the broker must show that he called the
potential purchaser's attention to the property •
. . • Dixson v. Kattel, 331 So.2d 827, Fla. App.
(1975).
. . • where the sale is traced to his introduction
of purchaser to owner or principal. Wilson v.
Sewell, 50 N.M. 121, 171 P.2d 647 (1946) •
. . • where broker brings parties together . •
Jones v. Torrance, 141 S.W.2d 1007, Tex. Civ.
App. (1940).
the original discovery of the purchaser •
ware v. DosPassos, 38 N.Y.S. 673 (1896).
b,

Initiation of Negotiations.
Most courts require that at the very least the broker

claiming a commission must have initiated the negotiations which
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result in the sale generating the commission.
v. Tapley,

Ok.

See for example

~

, 329 P.2d 672 (1958); and Dixson v. Kattel ,

supra.
c.

But for Causation.
Some courts have applied the traditional negligence test

respect to causation in determining whether a broker has been the
procuring cause of a sale.

That is, can it be said that "but for'

efforts of the broker, there would have been no sale to the eventu
purchaser.
App.

See for example Kadane v. Clark, 134 S.W.2d 448, Tex.

(1939); J-BMotors v. Margolis, 75 Ariz. 392, 257 P.2d 588

(1953); Corbitt v. Robinson, 53 So.2d 259, La. App.

(1951); and Ma

shall v. White, 245 F. Supp. 514 (D.C.N.C. 1965).
d.

Efficient Cause.
Several courts have equated procuring cause with what is

described as the efficient cause of the sale.

In practical applic

tion there appears to be no difference between the conduct require
this test and any of the other tests mentioned.

See for example

Hayden v. Ashley, 86 wa. 653, 150 P. 1147 (1915); and Neumeier v.
Sourzel, 223 Minn. 60, 25 N.W.2d 651 (1946).
In summary, a reading of the authorities makes it clear t
a licensed selling broker claiming a real estate commission must,
minimum, either find the buyer or initiate negotiations which lead
the sale generating the commission.
such broker must both

11

According to Judge Croft's Or

find" and "negotiate. 11

With respect to the

instant case the question then becomes did PCR find the buyer and/
commence negotiations to thus rise to the level of being the procu
cause of the subject sale.

A detailed examination of the facts in
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record clearly indicates that PCR was not the procuring cause of the
subject sale regardless of which test is applied.

PCR's involvement

was after the fact, tangential and relatively superficial, and it
cannot be seriously questioned that such belated involvement was the
result of Stevenson's effort to reward his personal friends, Reed and
Cole.

The chronology of the events as set forth in the table below

demonstrates that the involvement of PCR was relatively insignificant:
Involvement of Unionamerica
(Luce, Volk & Stevenson)

.'

to

er

Involvement of PC
(Reed and Cole)

1. September, 1977.
Initial contact between
Onionamerica and the
Buyer with respect to
the Village Land.

Initial contact made bet- Not present and not
ween Luce, a member of the involved.
Board of Directors of
Unionamerica, Inc., and
Davis, the principal owner
of the Buyer. ~ 42 a,
Statement of Facts.

2. September, 1977.
Initial contact between
Volk, the president of
Onionamerica, Inc., and
Davis.

Luce, as a "mutual
acquaintance" of both Volk
and Luce brought them together by telephone.
' 42 a, b, Statement of
Facts.

3. September, 1977.
Second contact between
Onionamer ica and the
Buyer.

Not present and not
Consists of l or 2 teleinvolved.
phone conversations between Volk and Davis during
which Davis declares his
interest in purchasing the
Village Land. ~ 42 b, e,
Statement of Facts.

4. September, 1977.
Prequalification of
credit worthiness of
the Buyer.

Not present and not
Luce was well acquainted
with Davis' credit worthi- involved.
ness because Luce managed
a financial institution
which had historically
financed Davis' enterprises,
and Volk was comfortable
with the Buyer because of
Luce's recommendation.
~ 42 a, Statement of Facts.

i~:
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?

Not present and not
involved.

.

J
'

5. September or prior
to October 3, 1977.
Initial furnishing of
written materials to
the Buyer extolling the
virtues of the Village
Land.

The Feasibility Study,
Not present an·
containing a detailed ana- involved.
lysis of the potential
uses and value of the Village land, which value was
stated to be the eventual
selling price of $1,600,000,
was sent by Unionamerica
and received by Davis.
~ 42 d, Statement of Facts.

6. September or prior
to October 3, 1977.
Agreement to have representatives of Unionamerica and the Buyer
meet to discuss the
sales transaction and
physically inspect the
Village Land.

Volk and Davis telephonically agreed to meet in
Park City, Utah which
meeting would require the
participants therein to
come to Park City from out
of State. ~ 42 e, Statement of Facts

Not present an:
involved.

7. October 3, 1977.
More pronounced interest
in acquiring the Village
Land as Davis and his
wife travel from San
Diego, California to
meet with representatives of Unionamerica
to discuss the subject
transaction and physically inspect the
Village Land.

Both Volk and Stevenson
travel to Salt Lake City,
but only Stevenson travels
to Park City to meet with
Davis and his wife. ~ 42
h, Statement of Facts.

Not present an:
involved.

8. October 3, 1977.
Initial meeting in Park
City between representatives of Unionamerica
and the Buyer.

Not present ani·
Stevenson spends 2 to 3
not involved.
hours discussing the subject transaction with
Davis including discussing
the merits of Park City in
general, and the Feasibility Study and the uses
of the Village Land in
particular. ~ 42 p, Statement of Facts.

9. Sometime Prior to
October 4, 1977. Davis
read the Feasibility
Study. ~ 42 q, Statement of Facts.

Not present and not
involved.

-38-

Not present ani
involved.
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l

10. Morning of October
4 1977. Breakfast
m~eting in Park City
between representatives
of unionamer ica, the
Buyer and PCR.

Stevenson, who had authority to sell, negotiate
terms, price etc. was present representing Unionamer ica. ' 42 p, q,
Statement of Facts.

Both Reed and Cole · I
were present and th
was their first in- .
volvement. Accor di
to Reed, Davis
already knew a lot
about the Village
Land. ' 42, p, q,
Statement of Facts.

11. October 4, 1977.
Representatives of
unionamerica, the Buyer
and PCR tour Park City
and physically inspect
the Village Land.

Stevenson present the
entire time. ' 42 r,
Statement of Facts.

Reed and Cole prese
the entire time.
' 42 4, Statement o
Facts.

12. Later afternoon of
October 4, 1977.
Meeting between representative of Unionamer ica and the Buyer
following the physcial
inspection of the
Village Land.

Not present and not
Stevenson and Davis disinvolved.
cussed the subject transaction alone, at which
time Davis indicated his
definite interest in
aquiring the property because by this time he was
committeed to such acquisition and as to him it was
a very easy sale to make.
' 42 s, Statement of Facts.

13. Sometime between
October 4, and October
17, 1977. Oral confirmation to Unionamerica
by the Buyer of the
Buyer's desire to purchase the Village Land.

Davis telephonically
advised Volk that he
wished to purchase the
Village Land at Unionamer ica' s asking price
of $1,600,000, leading
Volk to later say that
Volk "solicitated Davis
into this company." '
42 t, Statement of Facts.

Not present and not I
involved.

14. Between October 8,
and October 17, 1977.
Representatives of PCR
and the Buyer arrange to
meet in San Diego.

Not present and not
involved.

Reed, Cole and Davi
telephonically
arrange the meeting:
' 42 w, Statement c
Facts.

15. Morning of October
17, 1977. Drafting and
the Buyer's signing of
the Earnest Money Agreement.

Stevenson telephonically
discussed with Reed for 5
minutes the details of the
Earnest Money Agreement.
' 42 x, Statement of
Facts.

Reed, Cole and Davi
drafted the Earnest
Money Agreement.
' 42 x, Statement c
Facts.

I'

1
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16. Afternoon of October 17, 1977. Signing
of the Earnest Money
Agreement by UnionAmer ica.

Stevenson signed the
Earnest Money Agreement on
behalf of Unionamerica.
~ 42 y, Statement of
Facts.

Reed and Cole .
carried the E'•11
Money Agreemen!
San Diego to~·
Angeles and pr;
same to Stevem
~f 42 y, Staten:
Facts.
·

17. On or about October 22 through October
24, 1977. Representatives of Unionamerica,
the Buyer and PCR
meeting in Salt Lake
City to prepare the
Real Estate Agreement,
which Unionamerica and
the Buyer execute on
October 24, 1977.

Stevenson represented and
signed the Real Estate
Agreement on behalf of
Unionamerica. ~ 43,
Statement of Facts.

Reed and Cole 1
involved throu1
n 42 bb, 43,i
ment of Facts,

Of the 17 chronological events listed in the foregoing

t~k

note that PCR was involved on only 6 occasions, and on only 1 of tho:'
occasions was PCR

invo1~1ed

without Unionamerica also being involved,

1

Note also that any such involvement on the part of PCR came very lat!

I

in the history of the transaction, AFTER Unionamer ica had both found
and initiated substantial negotiations.

It

is also telling that even

after Cole and Reed first became involved with the Buyer on the mar·
ning of October 4, 1977, Davis didn't tell them he intended to buy U1
property until after he had told Stevenson he wanted to buy and

~U

Volk that he would buy at Unionamerica's asking price.
Since Judge Croft's Order listed the appropriate tests for
determining procuring cause in terms of the conjunctive "find" a~
"negotiate;" and since Judge Croft's Order with respect to those~~
is consistent with the authorities cited herein; and since Judge
Croft• s Order expressly stated that it was the law of the case; and
since the Trial Court considered itself bound and expressly decidedt
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follow Judge Croft's Order; and in light of Unionamerica's admission
that Unionamerica found the Buyer, which admission is entirely consistent with the facts as recited above; and in light of PCR's admission
that PCR was involved in the transaction to represent the interests of
the Buyer, which admission is entirely consistent with the facts as
recited above; we submit there is no evidence in the record to support
the Trial Court's determination that PCR was the procuring cause of
the subject sale.

B. PCR WAS NOT A LICENSED BROKER, THEREFORE LACKED CAPACITY
TO SUE, AND THEREFORE PCR'S COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
1.

The Trial Court's determination on the issue of whether PCR
was a licensed real estate broker is most broadly stated in ' S, Trial

!

\5

The Trial Court's determination.

Court Findings, which reads as follows:
I

Defendant PCR, Inc. dba Skyline Realty (Skyline)
is a Utah corporation having its principal place
of business in Summit County and was a licensed
real estate broker at all times material to the
issues of this case. (emphasis added)
The Trial Court made two other related specific determinations.

At

~

28, Trial Court Findings it provides:

The court finds that any defense as to the lack of
capacity by the defendant Park City Reservations,
Inc. to maintain this action should have been .
pleaded in plaintiffs' answer to the counterclaim
asserted by Park City Reservations, Inc., or, at
the very least 1 prior to trial. Although the
plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts upon which
they based the defense as to lack of capacity,
such defense was not raised until trial was almost
complete.
At I 10, Trial Court Conclusions, the Trial Court held:
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By virtue of plaintiffs' failure to timely raise
the defense of lack of capacity to maintain this
ac~ion, the court finds that any such defense was
waived by the plaintiffs. The court further finds
that any such defense must fail because at all
times pertinent to this action the defendant Harry
F. Reed was a broker licensed by the State of Utah
and was operating on behalf of Park City Reservations, Inc. dba Skyline Realty.
There is nothing in the Memorandum Decision on the subject of , 28,
Trial Court Findings or
2.

~

10, Trial Court Conclusions.

The uncontroverted facts establishing that PCR was unli·

censed.
It is Appellant's contention that the evidence in the recori'

I

I

precludes all reasonable basis in fact which can reasonably support
the Trial Court's finding that PCR was a licensed real estate broker.I
Such contention is supported by

n

~

4 - 7, Statement. of Facts, which

indisputable facts are summarized here as follows:
a.

Exhibits P-45, P-46, P-47, P-48 and P-49 clearly indicad

that Ladd E. Christensen as an individual doing business under the .
name Skyline Realty and Investment Company was the broker under whom
Reed was licensed as a broker/branch manager between December 1976~
July 1978.

Further, on or about July 1978 Reed as an individual~~

business as Skyline Land Company became his own broker and was no
longer a licensed real estate salesman under Christensen.

According!:

between the time the Settlement Agreement and Listing were entered ·
into and the subject sales. transaction closed and the Commission was
earned, Reed was not the primary real estate broker for any individua:
or entity but at most was a broker/branch manager for his broker
Christensen.
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b.

At trial, Reed himself testified that he knew of no docu-

ment whatsoever that would establish that he at anytime was ever a
broker for PCR.
c.

It is no wonder then that PCR is not even mentioned in

any of the records maintained by the Real Estate Division of the Utah
state Department of Business Regulations.

Based upon a diligent

search of such records, Steven J. Francis, the Director of said division certified to the Trial Court that:

ri
'

:a ti

[N]o record or entry is found to exist in
the records of said office showing that Park City
Reservations, Inc., whether as a corporation,
partnership, association, sole proprietorship or
any other entity is or ever has been a licensed
real estate broker or broker company in the State
of Utah, and that • • . no record of entry is
found to exist in the records showing that Harry
F. Reed is or ever has been a licensed real estate
broker authorized to act as such broker for any
corporation, partnership, association, sole proprietorship or any other entity known and designated as Park City Reservations, Inc. Ex. P-34.
(emphasis added)
d.

Please note that no where in the record is there any

indication that Reed ever acted as a broker for any corporation.
ar.'

ngl

as

dua.

Be

acted as a broker/branch manager under Christensen doing business in
Christensen's individual capacity, and thereafter Reed acted as his
own broker doing business in Reed's own individual capacity as Skyline
Land Company.

This is entirely consistent with the fact that about

the same time Reed began acting as his own broker, in his individual
capacity he filed an assumed name certificate with the Secretary of
State of the State of Utah to transact his business under the assumed
name Skyline Land company, which is the same name in which he was
doing business as an individual as a real estate broker beginning in
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-July of 1978.

This was after the subject transaction was

conplet~.

Ex. P. 51.
3.

The law and its application to the foregoing facts,

According to subsection 61-2-18(a) of the License Law:
No • • • corporation shall bring or maintain an
action in any court of this state for the recovery
of commission, a fee, or compensation for any act
done or service rendered, the doing or rendering
of which is prohibited under the provisions of
this act other than licensed real estate brokers
unless such person was duly licensed hereunder as
a real estate broker at the time of the doing of
such act or the rendering of such service.
(emphasis added)
Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 61-2-1, 61-2-2 and 61-2-9(c),
the License Law, the corporation, PCR, was clearly acting as a "real
estate broker" within the meaning of Section 61-2-2 and had to have:
license as required by Section 61-2-1.
The authorities are in complete accord with the proposition
that subsection 61-1-18 (a) quoted above means exactly what it says.
Under such legislative prohibition, as a general proposition •it goe>
almost without saying . • • a broker is without right to recover com·
pensation for his services per formed while he was unlicensed."
Jur.2d Brokers § 178.
at page 775.

12 Al

See also the cases collected in 169 A.L.R. ~

More specifically the same proposition holds true with

respect to situations where one broker sues another broker as in the
case at bar.

In Stanson v. McDonald, 147 Oh. 191, 70 N.E.2d 359, HI

A.L.R. 760 (1946) the court applied a statute similar to our own toa
situation where the plaintiff was licensed when negotiations began,
but was unlicensed when the real estate commission was earned.

The

Ohio court held that there could be no recovery against a co-broker r·
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a fee splitting contract because of the plaintiff's unlicensed
status.

In so holding, the court stated that when the legislature

"has said there is no right of action, courts are without authority to
create one and thus defy the law of the state."

169 A. L.R. 764.

More

recently in Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33, 436 P.2d 248 (1968) the
Idaho Supreme Court construing the Montana real estate licensing
statute held that "no matter what hardships it may work or how strong
equities appear, a fee splitting agreement between brokers is
unenforceable by an unlicensed broker. n
Our own court has also ruled that a claimant seeking to
recover for services tantamount to the services of a real estate
broker cannot maintain an action to collect a commission if the
claimant is unlicensed.

Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf

Course, Inc., Utah, 584 P.2d 848 (1978).
It is important to note that there is no inconsistency
between the conclusions reached by the foregoing authorities and this
court's 1980 decision in Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills
Development Co., Utah, 614 P.2d 155 (1980).

In that case the

unlicensed corporate plaintiff had an exclusive right to sell
defendant's properties pursuant to a marketing agreement.

However,

the individual plaintiff Hendricks was a licensed real estate broker
and the individual plaintiff Snarr was a licensed real estate salesman
under the .defendant licensed corporate broker, albeit Snarr was paid
by the unlicensed corporate plaintiff.
i

The court held that plaintiffs

could recover the contested commission because Snarr could sue his own
corporate broker with whom Snarr was "connected" and with whom Snarr
had a "valid broker-salesman relationship," and also because the
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exclusive sales contract entitled the unlicensed corporate plaintiff
to a "commission on a sale consummated by a licensed salesman." In
the case at bar the situation is different because we don't have a
licensed salesman suing his own broker as permitted by Subsection
61-2-18(b) of the License Law.

This is not a Subsection 18(b) can,

Instead, because there is no licensed claimant in the present case,,
have under consideration a situation where Subsection 18 (a) applies,
Here, pursuant to the only counterclaim pled, the unlicensed corpmt
ti on, PCR, is the only claimant.
to the counterclaim.

Reed and Cole are not even parties

Accordingly, based upon the plain language of

Subsection 61-2-18(a), since PCR was not licensed, PCR may

not·~~

or maintain" its counterclaim.
The legal disability incurred by PCR as a result of its

u~

licensed status is commonly referred to as a "lack of capacity to su!
which disability deprives a party of the right to come into court.
The legal capacity to sue is essential to being a proper party plain·
tiff which status in turn is essential to confer jurisdiction on t~
court.

59 Am. Jur.2d Parties

§§

20, 31.

The foregoing propositions are consistent with Art. 8,

§ 7o

the Utah State Constitution and Section 78-3-4 Utah Code Annotated
(1953) both of which provide:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal not
excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by
law; • . • . (emphasis added)
In light of the quoted language, as soon as it becomes apparent that
an unlicensed claimant is seeking to recover for services as a re~
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estate broker then the court no longer has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.

Such a conclusion is no different than

those reached in the numerous federal court cases in which claims have
been dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction when, during
the course of the proceedings, it becomes apparent that there is
little likelihood that the claimant can recover the federal jurisdictional amount.

See the cases collected in Moore's Federal

Practice, Volume 2A,
4.

§

1207 (2] fn 8 at page 2254.

The Trial Court erred in determining that Appellant had

waived its rights predicated upon PCR's lack of capacity to sue.
As noted above, although the Memorandum Decision was silent
on the issue of waiver being discussed here,
clusions determined there was such a waiver.

~

10, Trial Court ConOf course, such

conclusion is inconsistent with the Trial Court's express determination in said

~

10 that PCR was in fact a licensed corporate real

estate broker through Reed, and the very fact that opposing counsel
and the Trial Court found it necessary to adopt such a conclusion
casts fatal aspersions on the Trial Court's decision that PCR was
licensed.

Nonetheless, the Trial Court's determination as to waiver

is equally erroneous as appears from the following discussion.
In reliance on Crockett's and Reed's direct representations
to the contrary, as established by the facts recited in ~! 11, 12, 16,
Statement of Facts, Appellant's counsel did not discover PCR's lack of
capacity to sue until just prior to trial at which time said counsel
was precluded from using further pre-trial motions by District Court
Rule 10.

Then, when the issue was raised at trial, the court

expressly held that Respondents had not been unduly surprised by
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Appellant's evidence of lack of capacity.

Thereafter, it was not

until the conclusion of Appellant's opening argument that any cont er.
tion was made that Appellant had waived the effect of PCR's lack of
capacity.
It seems unbelievable that Crockett and Reed could mislead
counsel for Appellant, as was done in this case, and then claim that
Appellant waived the effect of the true facts because they were not
brought out until the time of trial, when the reason they were not
brought out until the time of trial was because of District

Court~

10.

Even if it can be said that the defense of lack of capacity
to sue was waived as belatedly contended by PCR, such lack of capa·
city was not waived as to Appellant's cause of action for a declara·
tory judgment determining that PCR was not entitled to recover from
Appellant any part of the Commission.
Fourth Amended Complaint.

See Count XIII of Appellant's

Further, according to Section 61-2-1 of tt'

License Law, it was unlawful for PCR to act as a real estate broker a:
was done in this case "without first obtaining a license."

Since

Appellant pled "illegality" as an affirmative defense to PCR's coun·
terclaim, PCR's lack of capacity to sue based on PCR's unlicensed ano
therefore illegal conduct, was not waived but rather was expressly
preserved as a justiciable issue.

See Appellant's replies to each

counterclaim pled by PCR.
Further, with respect to the issue of waiver, it is elemen·
tary that subject matter jurisdiction may be contested at any time,
even on appeal.
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C. PCR CONDUCTED ITS BUSINESS AND PROSECUTED ITS COUNTERCLAIM
UNDER AN ASSUMED NAME WITHOUT HAVING FILED A CERTIFICATE OF
ASSUMED NAME, THEREFORE PCR LACKED CAPACITY TO SUE, AND
THEREFORE PCR'S COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
1.

The Trial Court's determination.

The Trial Court made no determination on this issue except as
implied by ,, 28, Trial Court Findings, and

~

10, Trial Court Conclu-

sions as quoted above with respect to Point I B.

Conspicuous by their

absence are any findings or conclusions with respect to whether PCR
was required to file an assumed name certificate or whether such certificate was in fact filed.
2.

The uncontroverted facts.

As discussed in Point I B 4 above, the facts recited in ,, 8
- 16, Statement of Facts, clearly establish that PCR did not file the
required assumed name certificate to do business under the assumed
name of Skyline Realty or any other assumed name.

Notwithstanding

such failure, in its Answer to Appellant's Fourth Amended Complaint,
PCR incorporated its Counterclaim as pled in its Answer to the First

Amended Complaint.

The introductory paragraph in that Counterclaim

establishes without question that PCR was suing Appellant and prosecuting the Counterclaim in an assumed name.

Such paragraph reads in

pertinent part as follows:
The defendant-counterclaimant Park City Reservations, Inc., dba Skyline Realty (hereinafter
"Skyline") complains • • • as follows • • • •
(emphasis added)
3.

The law and its application to the facts.

According to Section 42-2-5 of the Assumed Name Law, every
corporation conducting its business in this state under an assumed
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name must file an

assumed name certificate with the office of the

Secretary of State.

If a corporation fails to file such certificat!

that corporation "shall not ~, prosecute or maintain any action,
suit, counterclaim, cross-complaint or proceeding in any of the cour
of this state until the provisions of this chapter have been cornpli!:
with."

(emphasis added)

Section 42-2-10, Assumed Name Law.

We can find no cases that have considered the effect of our
Section 42-2-10.

There are three cases that considered Utah's assut'

name statutory provisions prior to 1963 when Utah first enacted
language of Section 42-2-10 quoted above.

t~

Christenson v. Johnson, r

Utah 273, 61 P. 2d 593 (1936): Oakason v. Lisbon Valley Uranium Co.,
154 F. Supp. 692 (D.C. Ut. 1957): and Platt v. Locke, 11 Utah 2d 271
358 P.2d 95 (1961).

However, with respect to our specific statutory

prohibition against suing, prosecuting, or maintaining any

counte~

claim in any of the courts of this state without first filing an
assumed name certificate, the courts that have considered similar
provisions in other states are unanimous in holding that such a
statute means precisely what it says, viz: no suit without compliance.

42 A.L.R. 2d 516, 533, Section 7.
While it has been uniformly held that a claimant can remove

such legal disability and acquire the capacity to sue simply by fiil
the required certificate at any time before completion of the takin~
of evidence at trial, in the instant case at no time did PCR seek~
present any evidence that it had in fact filed such a certificate,~:
did PCR seek a continuance of trial for a time long enough to enable
PCR to file the required certificate.

Instead PCR rested its case.

Thereafter, following a noon recess, PCR sought to reopen its case,
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but then only preferred evidence that Reed had acted in good faith
with respect to PCR doing business under the assumed name of Skyline
Realty.

The Trial Court refused to permit the case to be reopened.

one day later, following the conclusion of counsel for Appellant's
opening argument, PCR expanded its profer of proof of the previous day
to include evidence that prior counsel for PCR thought he had filed or
had intended to file the required certificate for PCR, but that such
certificate was not of record.

See ,, 15, 16, Statement of Facts.

The point is that none of the evidence proferred can change in the
least the conclusion that at all times pertinent hereto, PCR was burdened by a legal disability constituting PCR's lack of capacity to
seek redress in the courts of this state.
Note that Section 42-2-10 of the Assumed Name Law states
"shall not sue, prosecute or maintain," while Section 61-2-lB(a) of
the License Law discussed in Point I B above states "Shall [not] bring
or maintain an action in any court of this state."

Clearly then, what

has been said earlier in Point I B above with respect to the courts
lack of subject matter jurisdiction applies persuasively here, and the
lack of capacity to sue encountered by PCR as a result of the legal
disability created by Section 42-2-10 also constitutes a lack of subject matter jurisdiction entitling Appellant to dismissal of PCR's
Counterclaim.
Further, what has been said in Point I B above with respect
to Respondent's contention that Appellant had waived the issue of lack
of capacity applies equally here.
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D.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING APPELLANT COMPEN
SATORY DAMAGES RESULTING FROM PCR' S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DU
OR ITS DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH, AND SUCH DAMAGES ARE A
TOTAL OFFSET TO PCR'S CLAIM AGAINST APPELLANT.
1.

The Trial Court's determination.

The only Trial Court finding or conclusion on this iss~ h

found in 11 8, Trial Court Conclusions, which paragraph reads in per
nent part as follows:
The court finds that there is no factual basis for
a finding of • • • breach of a duty to act in good
faith, breach of a fiduciary duty . • • and the
court concludes that none of the foregoing torts
occurred in this case.
Notwithstanding Appellant's request that the court

makes~

cific findings as to whether Respondents had any duties to deal fai

and in good faith with Appellant and whether each of the Respondent
stood in a fiduciary relationship with Appellant and therefore

ow~

any fiduciary duties to Appellant, and in spite of the fact that su
issues had been raised by the pleadings and evidence had been presented with respect thereto, the court refused to make any findings
to whether such duties were in fact owed or whether any of the Res1
dents stood in a fiduciary relationship with Appellant.

The Trial

court only addressed the issue of whether such duties had been
breached.

See

n

82 through 87 of the Findings of Fact and H 31

through 38 of the Conclusions of Law attached to

Plaintiff's Objei

tion to Form of Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusi 1
of Law and Judgment dated June 23, 1980.
2.

The uncontroverted facts.

After reviewing the facts recited in
j

n

22, 31-33, 35-37,

- p, u, v, z, aa, Statement of Facts, can there be any question
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i:

n:

this case but what Taylor acting on behalf of the Appellant innocently
reposed confidence in Reed acting on behalf of PCR with whom Taylor
bad enjoyed a mutually satisfactory broker to broker relationship for
many years, and that Taylor justifiably assumed Reed would not take
any action inconsistent with Appellant's rights under the Listing.

On

the other hand can there be any doubt that Reed was in a position of
superiority and influence as to Taylor because Reed knew what Taylor
did not know, namely that Appellant's principal, Unionamerica, had
found and already negotiated with the Buyer before Reed and Cole had
ever been involved.
When Stevenson first involved Reed and Cole in the transaction and Reed and Cole did nothing to investigate Appellant's rights
under the Settlement Agreement and the Listing, Appellant's soft
underbelly was exposed, but Appellant didn't even suspect the danger
because Taylor trusted his fellow broker, Reed.

After Stevenson first

involved Reed and Cole in the transaction on October 8, 1977, Cole
sent the registration letter to Appellant without disclosing the fact
that Unionamerica had found and negotiated with the Buyer without the
assistance of Reed or Cole.

The danger to Appellant was magnified

because Reed and Cole were further solidifying PCR's position by
telling the world that the Buyer was PCR's client for purposes of the
subject sale.

Later on October 15, 1977, when Reed personally

approached Taylor to confirm that the multiple listing arrangement was
in effect between them with respect to the subject transaction, Reed
attempted to dig a deeper hole for Appellant by not

revealing to

Appellant that unionamerica had found and negotiated with the Buyer
without the assistance of Reed or Cole.

Still later, on October 19,
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1977, Reed perpetuated the previous concealments by attempting to,

the truth.

This Reed did by simply telling Taylor a lie as tot~

source of the Buyer.

We are talking about real estate agents, trui:

fiduciaries, dealing with each other.
a fiduciary in this state be condoned.

Can such conduct on the part
Not only condoned, but

rewarded to the extent of $57,600.
3.

The law and its application to the facts.

Appellant contends that the law of the State of Utah permi:
Appellant to recover compensatory damages from PCR under the circu1·
stances of this case, especially in light of Appellant's nconsidera:
diminished" burden of proof with respect to the pertinent facts.
While the Trial Court refused to rule one way or the other
whether Appellant and PCR and their respective representatives were
a fiduciary relationship and therefore owed fiduciary duties to

e~

other, it is elementary that such was the case.
As discussed previously in Point I A, in the

relationsh~

between Appellant and PCR, Appellant was the principal and PCR was:
agent.

Hence, they were parties to a fiduciary relationship whicl

brought with it the special duties that must be observed by parties
such relationships.

As was said in 37 Am. Jur.2d Fraud and Deceiti

16:
The cases of parent and child, guardian and
ward, trustee and cestui que trust, principal and
?gent and attorney and client are familiar
instances in which the principal of fiduciary
relationship applies in its strictest sense .
(emphasis added)
3 Am. Jur.2d Agency§ 199 elaborates on the agent's fiduciary dutyi

follows:
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An agent is a fiduciary with respect to the
matte:s w~thi~ the scope of his agency. The very
relation implies that the principal has imposed
some trust or confidence in the agent and the
agent or employee is bound to the exercise of the
utmost good faith, loyalty, and honesty toward his
principal or employer.
(emphasis added)
see also Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 P. 318, 62 A.L.R. 54
(1927) •

More specifically, according to Reese v. Harper, 80 Utah 2d
119, 329 P.2d 410

(1958) a real estate broker is a party to a fidu-

ciary relationship and has the responsibility of honestly and fairly
representing those who engage his services.
According to the foregoing authorities, the fiduciary relationship between Appellant and PCR imposed on PCR the duty to exercise
"good faith" toward Appellant.

What does that mean?

Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed. (1979) defines "good faith"
as:

Honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. An honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscious advantage of another even
through technicalities of law, together with
absense of all information, notice, or benefit or
belief of facts which render the transaction unconscientious.
(emphasis added)
In point is the decision of Ammerman v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange,
19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967) wherein our court held that a

cause of action predicated on bad faith can be properly regarded as a
cause of action for a wrong done by violating a fiduciary duty owed.
Thus our court equated the duty to act in good faith with the duty

~ incurred in a fiduciary relationship.

-55-
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The fiduciary relationship between Appellant and PCR

~~

brought with it the duty of avoiding any misrepresentations and mat
full disclosure on the part of PCR.
Brokers

§

As was said in 12 Am. Jur .2d

84 a broker:
cannot put himself in the position rightfully belonging to his principal. He cannot put
himself in a position antagonistic to his principal 's interest by fraudulent conduct, acting
adversely to his client's interest, or by failing
to communicate information he may possess or
require which is or may be material to his
employer's advantage or otherwise. Standing in
the place of and representing his employer, a
broker is bound to disregard every feeling of
friendship, to know no self interest, and to act
as he judges the interest of his employer would
induce the latter to act if he were present."
(emphasis added)

With respect to describing the duty of disclosure, our own
Utah court has stated that such duty requires "good faith and the
disclosure of all pertinent fact."

Reich v. Christopolos, 123 Utah

132, 256 P.2d 238 (1952), and requires "honesty, fair representatio
and the making of all disclosures necessary."
Utah 2d 150, 364 P.2d 70 (1961).

Shaw v. Abraham, 12

See also Reese v. Harper, supra.

As has been said before, PCR comrni tted a serious breach ol
confidence when it failed to make full disclosure to its princip~
that Reed and Cole had been approached on October 3, 1977 by Appel·
lant's principal, Unionarnerica; when the registration letter was
mailed on October 8, 1977; when Reed met with Taylor on October 15
1977 and asked him to confirm their understanding as to splitting
commission; and on October 19 when Reed intentionally mislead TaY 1'
as to the source of the Buyer.

According to recent Utah authori~
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such conduct has been labeled not only as a breach of fiduciary duty,
but also constructive fraud.
In Blodgett v. Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 298 (1978) in holding
that the trustee named in a trust deed was a party to a fiduciary
relationship with the truster named in the same trust deed, our court
neld that in cases involving a "confidential relationship" the "plaintiff's burden is considerably diminished."

The court further held

that the breach of fiduciary duty may be regarded as constructive
fraud for the purpose of enabling the court to rectify any injury
resulting from the breach of the obligations implicit in the relationship.

Here, the rectification sought is simply to reverse the

Trial Court's $57,600 reward to PCR for breaching its fiduciary duty
to Appellant.

In Blodgett the court also quoted with approval 37 Arn.

Jur.2d 38 Fraud and Deceit

§

15 which provides:

. • • fraud is often presumed or inferred where a
confidential or fiduciary relationship exists
between the parties to a transaction or contract.
Constructive fraud often exists where the
parties to a transaction of a special confidential
or fiduciary relation which affords the power and
means to take undue advantage, or exercise undue
influence over, the other. A course of dealing
between ~ersons so situated is watched with
extreme Jealously and solicitude7 and if there if
found the slightest trace of undue influence or
unfair advantage, redress will be given to the
injured party. No part of the jurisdiction of the
court is more useful than that which it exercises
in watching and controlling transactions between
parties standing in such a relationship of confidence to each other • • • •
Where a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists it is the duty of the person in whom
the conf ide~ce is reposed to exercise the utmost
good faith in the transaction, to make full and
truthful disclosures of all material facts and to
refrain from abusing such confidence by obtaining
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any advantage to himself at the expense of the
confiding party. Should he obtain such advantage
he will not be permitted to retain the benefit and
the transaction will be set aside even though it
could not have been impeached and no such relation
existed, whether the unconscionable advantage was
obtained by misrepresentations, concealment or
suppression of material facts, artiface or undue
influence.
(emphasis added)
As Reed himself said, his misleading of taylor was a
and "ridiculous" thing to do.

"d~b

However, by such admission, Reed rat

fies the conclusion that there is nothing in the record reasonably
precluding the conclusion that PCR breached its fiduciary duty to
Appellant and that Appellant is entitled to recover from PCR compen
satory damages as an offset against any judgment awarded to PCR.
There is another reason, perhaps peculiar to Utah, why in
this case it must be said· that PCR breached its fiduciary duty to
Appellant.

According to Subsection 61-2-6(a) and (b) of the

Li~M

Law, the qualities of "honesty," "integrity," "truthfullness" and
"trustworthiness" are prerequisites for all Utah licensed real
salesmen and brokers.

es~

Further, on November 11, 1973 pursuant to th

rule making power conferred by Subsection 61-2-S(b) of the License

Law, the State Securities Commission adopted the State of Utah Real

Estate Licensing Laws Rules and Regulations, Rule 19 of which prori

in pertinent part as follows: "Brokers are required to treat salesm

and other brokers ethically and in accordance with good business pr
tices."

(emphasis added)

It is Appellant's contention that Reed and Cole acting for
PCR breached the duties imposed upon them by Rule 19.

Note that Ru

19 talks in terms of ethics and good business practices.

Accordi~

Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed. (1979) ethics has to due with
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•moral" duties, beliefs, character, actions and that conduct which is
•professionally right or befitting; conforming to professional standards of conduct."

On the other hand, from the same source conduct is

said to be moral if it consistent with the "general principals of
right conduct" and "cognizable and enforceable only by the conscience
or by the principals of right conduct, as distinguished from positive
law."
Although we are dealing here with relatively abstract
notions, it is clear from the foregoing statutory provisions and Rule
19, that real estate practioners in this state should be held to a
very high standard of professional conduct, such that they be required
to avoid the very appearance of impropriety.

We can find no case that

construes or applies Rule 19, but as a practical matter Rule 19 is
probably just another way of saying that Reed and Cole, as agents,
were required to act as fiduciaries with respect to Appellant and
consequently discharge all obligations owed to Appellant implicit in
that designation.
d~inish

One thing appears certain.

Rule 19 does not

PCR's duties or excuse its conduct.
Based upon the foregoing discussion it appears obvious that

in this case Appellant had the right to repose special trust and confidence in Reed and Cole, and had the right to expect them to treat
Appellant fairly, without misrepresentations, with full disclosure,
with utmost loyalty, without betrayal, in good faith, ethically and in
accordance with good business practices.
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E.

RELIEF REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO POINT I

For all the reasons discussed in this Point I, Appellant

respectfully requests an order of the court reversing the judgment
PCR's Counterclaim in favor of PCR and against Appellant and the

e

of judgment thereon in favor of Appellant and against PCR, no caus
action.

POINT II

ASSUMING THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING
THAT PCR WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER A SELLING BROKER'S
COMMISSION FROM APPELLANT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED
TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FROM UNIONAMERICA AND STEVENSON
IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE AMOUNT AWARDED PCR.
A. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES FROM UNIONAMERICA AND STEVENSON AS A RESULT OF
THEIR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY.
Like PCR, Unionamerica was a party to a fiduciary relatio
ship with Appellant.

However, in the case of the Unionamerica -

Appellant relationship, Unionamerica was the principal acting thro
Stevenson while Appellant was the agent acting through Taylor. No
theless, Unionamerica still owed a fiduciary duty to Appellant.
was said in 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers

§

167:

It is a rule of universal recognition that the
principal must act in good faith toward the broker,
and in the event of his failure to do so, the
broker will not be deprived of his commissions
solely by reason of his employer's breach of duty.
If the broker performs his part of the contract by
doing all that he is required to do and is prevented from or deprived of the opportunity.of.
consummating the sale by the act of the principal,
he is still entitled to his commission .
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--

n·

u~·

n<·

.
• •• moreover, the principal cannot deprive
his agent of the compensation stipulated for
either by fraudulently making a sale himself at
the same or different price, or by switching the
buyer from one agent to another. (emphasis added)
More specifically in 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers § 226, where an exclusive
right to sell form of listing is the predicate for the agreement between the owner and the broker, the rule is "there is an implied
£romise on the part of the owner to do nothing to hinder or obstruct
Eerformance by the broker."

(emphasis added)

Again, in 3 Am. Jur.2d Agency§ 239, the rule is expressed as
follows:
The principal is subject to a duty to his agent to
perform the contract which is made with the agent
and a duty not to repudiate or terminate the
employment in violation of the contract. The
principal must conduct himself in such a way as
not to interfere with the consummation of the
agency and the agency contract carries with it an
implied obligation on the part of the principal to
do nothing that would thwart the effectiveness of
the agency.
(emphasis added)
When Stevenson called Appellant's office on the morning of
October 3, 1977 and failed to involve any of Appellant's licensed
personnel in the subject transaction; when Stevenson arrived in Park
City the evening of October 3, 1977, and before even meeting with
Davis, Stevenson involved Reed and Cole in the subject transaction
instead of Appellant's licensed personnel; when, on October 4, 1977,
after meeting with Davis the evening of October 3, 1977 and negotiating the transaction with Davis for a period of 2 to 3 hours,
Stevenson involved Reed and Cole in the subject transaction instead of
Appellant's licensed personnel; and when Stevenson at no time thereafter took the initiative in disclosing to Appellant that he had
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directed the Buyer to Reed and Cole, both Unionameria through Ste~
son, and Stevenson himself, breached their fiduciary duties to Appe:.
lant and the implied promises inherent in the fiduciary relationshi;
See

~

42 g, i, n, p, Statement of Facts.
According to Blodgett v. Martsch, supra, such conduct is

tantamount to constructive fraud and according to the numerous autk
rities cited above, Unionamerica and Stevenson are liable to

Ap~Ur

for the damages sustained by Appellant as a result of such construe·
tive fraud and/or breach of fiduciary duty.

Of course, if the Trial

Court's judgment in favor of PCR is not affirmed, Appellant concedes
that it would not be entitled to any such damages inasmuch as the
Trial Court awarded the full amount of the Commission to Appellant
subject to Appellant's obligation to split the Commission with PCR.

B. THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON JUDGE CROFT'S ORDER, SUCH ORD:
IS PARTIALLY IN ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO IMPLIED
AGREEMENT TO DIRECT ANY WALK-IN TO APPELLANT, AND THEREFORE
ANY LIABILITY FROM APPELLANT TO PCR WAS WRONGFULLY CREATEDi
UNIONAMERICA AND STEVENSON.
With respect to Judge Croft's Order the Trial Court stated'
trial "I am not here to say that he is wrong, and I can't say he is
wrong."

T. 567.

That acknowledgment together with ~ 3, Memorandum

Decision, Appendix B, and ,, 4, Trial Court Conclusions, Appendix C,
make it clear that the Trial Court considered itself bound by Judge
croft's order.

While Judge Croft's Order was correct in holding pa

had to both find and negotiate the subject sale in order to recovua
selling broker's commission, it is Appellant's contention that a por·
tion of Judge Croft's Order was erroneous as a matter of law.
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we

believe Appellant's position is apparent from a careful examination of
the language of the Order itself.

Judge Croft held:

The court finds that the Settlement Agreement and
the Listing Agreement contemplate that other
parties not involved in the lawsuit might find
buyers for the listed properties and negotiate a
sale therefor, and that neither agreement contains
any express or implied provision that Unionamerica
or Ramshire would direct any "walk in buyer" to
plaintiffs. Such issues are thus now resolved for
all future proceedings in this case.
With the phrase "or implied" in the Order, the Order doesn't make
sense.

By stating that "other parties not involved in the lawsuit

might find buyers for the listed properties and negotiate a sale
therefor," while at the same time stating that there is no implication
that "Unionamerica or Ramshire would direct any 'walk in buyer' to
plaintiffs" is to state two directly contrary propositions.

There is

simply no way that a party not included in the previous lawsuit that
spawned the Settlement Agreement could have a walk-in buyer directed
to such party by Unionamerica and still have such party be the finder
of such buyer.

In such a situation, Unionamerica, which was involved

in the previous lawsuit, would be the finder of such buyer.

More

specifically, PCR, which was not a party to the previous lawsuit,
can't be the finder of the Buyer if the Buyer was found by Unionamerica
and directed to PCR.
referee.

PCR can't be both the finder and Unionamerica's

Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement and Listing taken

together clearly constitute an implied contract that Unionamerica
would direct any walk-in buyer to Appellant, which is consistent with
the authorities cited in Point II A above.

-63-
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When Unionamerica through Stevenson referred Davis and the
Buyer to Reed, Cole and PCR, Unionamerica breached its implied cove.
nant to direct any walk-in to Appellant.

Appellant's compensatory

damages for such breach are equal to the amount, if any, which

PO.

entitled to recover from Appellant pursuant to PCR' s counterclaim.
For the reasons discussed above in Point I, we don't believe PCR is
entitled to any such recovery, but in the event any such award is
affirmed, then such liability on the part of Appellant to PCR was
wrongfully and intentionally created by Unionamerica and Stevensoo
when Unionamerica breached its implied contract as aforesaid.
The right to recover damages for the wrongful and

inte~~

creation of a liability has been recognized in Section 87la of
Restatement of Torts 2d.

t~

The rule reads as follows:

One who intentionally creates civil or criminal
liability against another is subject to liability
to the other if his conduct is generally culpable
and not justifiable under the circumstances.
As the official comment to Section 87la indicates, the Section appl'•
to the established torts but also to wrongful action that does not
fall within one of the established torts.

Further, by reference to

Section 871 Restatement of Torts 2d. and the official comment thereC'
it is clear that the toJ:t recognized by Section 87la is intended to
accentuate the various tortious means by which harmful invasions cl
property interests are intentionally achieved, and to state a genera
ization comparable to the generalizations on negligence in other
sections of the Restatement.

We gather from these official comment:

that Section 87la is intended to be authority for the

prosecuti~~

intentional torts that do not fit within any of the more traditiona:
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catagorizations.

We think Appellant is entitled to recover pursuant

to such authority in the instant case.
As pointed out previously, Stevenson, acting on behalf of
unionamerica, affirmatively and intentionally sought out Reed and Cole
and through them PCR, to act as real estate agents with respect to the
subject transaction.

At the time Stevenson directed a walk-in buyer

to Reed, Cole and PCR, Stevenson knew that he would be exposing Appellant to the possibility of having to split its commission with the new
real estate agents, and he did this at a time when he had caused
unionamerica to grant an exclusive right to sell listing to Appellant,
and the aforesaid implied covenant to direct a walk-in buyer to
Appellant.

See '

42 i, Statement of Facts.

Stevenson thus wrongfully

and intentionall caused Unionamerica to breach its implied covenant to
direct walk-in buyers to Appellant.
We can find nothing in the record which controverts the facts
presented which are pertinent to the elements of Section 87la as
aforesaid.
Again, if the Trial Court judgment in favor of PCR is
reversed, Appellant concedes that it would not be entitled to any
compensatory damages resulting from a vi.olation of Section 87la as
aforesaid inasmuch as the Trial Court awarded the full amount of the
Commission to Appellant subject to Appellant's obligation to split the
Commission with PCR.
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C.

RELIEF REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO POINT II

For all the reasons discussed in this Point II, Appellant
respectfully requests this court to enter its judgment in favor of
Appellant and against Unionamer ica, Inc., Rams hire, Inc., and Steve:.
son for compensatory damages in an amount equal to the amount, if a~
awarded to PCR.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST ALL
RESPONDENTS
A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT UNIONAMERICA ACT!:
REASONABLY IN DEPOSITING ALL OF THE COMMISSION WITH THE
ESCROW HOLDER, AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR
APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST UNIONAMERICA FOR PUNITIVE DAMAG~
11 26, Trial Court Findings, provides: "Unionamer ica acted
reasonably in • • • depositing these funds in an escrow account in
light of the dispute."

11 9, Trial Court Conclusions, provides:

The court having concluded that defendants were
not guilty of tortious acts against the plaintiffs, and that none of the parties breached the
applicable contracts, hereby concludes that there
is no basis for plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages.
Appellant concedes that "in light of the dispute" it may har
been reasonable for Unionamerica to deposit 60% of the Commission wi:
the Escrow Holder, but we can find no evidence in the record, let
alone any evidence about which reasonable minds could differ, that
would justify Unionamerica placing the remaining 40% of the Commissl:
with the Escrow Holder.
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As •~ 42 cc, 47 - S3, Statement of Facts establishes, at no
time prior to suit being instituted did unionamerica even suggest that
Appellant was not entitled to 40% of the Commission.

As a matter of

fact, Unionamerica through its counsel conceded: (1) that the withholding of any of the Commission would constitute a breach of contract
on the part of Unionamerica; and (2) there was no basis for Unionamerica withholding from Appellant more than 60% of the Conunission.
Indeed, the judgment of the Trial Court awarding Appellant 100% of the
Commission, but requiring that 60% thereof be shared, confirms what
Unionamerica conceded all along.

How can it be said then that Union-

america could justifiably have withheld 40% of the Commission from
Appellant.
Other events, both before and after suit was instituted,
establish Unionamerica's cavalier, malicious and total disregard of
Appellant's rights.
Facts.

See

•• 25, 26, SS, S6, S8, S9, Statement of

It should be noted that under Utah law an act is malicious if

done "entirely without authority and in disregard of the rights" of
~hers.

Sproul v. Sparks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436 (1949).
In addition to its entitlement to compensatory damages

resulting from breach of contract as discussed in Point II above,
Appellant contends that Unionamerica is liable to Appellant for
compensatory damages resulting from Unionamerica's intentional torts
in diverting the commission from Appellant.

Appellant also contends

that punitive damages are recoverable for both reasons.

~

Under present

Utah law it apparently makes no difference whether Unionamerica's
liability for punitive damages is bottomed on breach of contract,
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud or any other

L
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reprehensible conduct deserving of punishment.

In Nash v. Craiq~
--:.

Inc., Utah, 585 P.2d 775 (1978) in holding that punitive damagesma
be awarded regardless of whether compensatory damages are awarded
was stated:

'.

The question of whether or not punitive damages
can be given and the amount thereof shall be
determined from the nature and type of the wrongful conduct rather than on the amount of money
awarded as actual damages since the purpose of the
award is to teach the defendant to not repeat the
wrong and to be a warning to others that such
conduct is not to be tolerated.
In his concurring opinion in that case, Judge Crockett wr 0t,
There is another aspect of the law of this state
which gives support to the ruling of the main
opinion. Our constitution, Section 19 of VIII
provides that "there shall be but one from of
civil action and law and equity may be administered in the same action." Pursuant to that
provision and the adjudication of this court
thereunder the trend of our law is and has been
toward the abolition of distinctions between law
and equity. This is particularly true since the
adoption of our new rules of civil procedure to
the effect that the court shall grant whatever
relief the evidence shows a party is entitled to.
These are additional reasons why I am in
agreement with the proposition that the question,
whether there should be an award of punitive
damages and the amount thereof should depend on
the nature of the wrong and not uesn an arbitary
and what seems to me to be an artificial barrier
thereto because of the nomenclature of the cause
of action.
(emphasis added)
The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Boise Dodge,.!E£:
v. Clark, 92 Idaho 904, 453 P. 2d 551 (1969) forthrightly makes the
point that the court should not be impractically concerned over
whether the claim sounds in contract or tort.

In that case, the

plaintiff had purchased a "new" automobile from the defendant.
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The

automobile was, in fact, a well used demonstrator on which the odometer had been turned back.

The plaintiff recovered judgment which

included an award of punitive damages.

On appeal, the defendant

argued that punitive damages were improperly awarded inasmuch as the
case was one for breach of contract.

The court rejected the defen-

dant's argument and held:
In any event, from the legal point of view from
the position of punitive damages in this case, it
does not matter whether respondent's counterclaiiii
technically sounded in contract or tort. The rule
• • • is that punitive damages may be assessed in
contract actions where there is fraud, malice,
oppression or other sufficient reason for doing
so. The rule recognizes that in certain cases
elements of tort, for which punitive damages have
always been recoverable upon showing of malice,
may be inextricably mixed with elements of contract in which punitive damages are generally not
recoverable.
(emphasis added)
That portion of the Idaho opinion has been favorably reviewed in Sullivan, "Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: the Reality and the
Illusion of Legal Change," 61 Minnesota Law Review 207, 239 (1977).
Notwithstanding the general rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in breach of contract actions, there are well established
exceptions to the rule which exceptions are applicable to the case at
bar.

Such exceptions appear in cases where the breaches of contract

mount to breaches of fiduciary duties, breaches of duties to deal
fairly and act in good faith, conversion, intentional or needless
disregard of the consequences, malice, economi~ oppression or independent torts arising out of breaches of contract, regardless of whether
such tort is pled in contract or tort.

The rationale, leading

supporting cases, and propriety of such exceptions is thoughtfully
discussed in "The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in
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Contract Actions," 8 Indiana Law Review 668 (1975), which consideri·
tions support the holding of our court in Nash v. Craig

co.

Inc,,

supra.
In the case at bar Unionamer ica was charged with conversk
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty to act in good faiu,,
fraud, any one of which would serve as a predicate for an award of
punitive damages in addition to the malicious breach of contract
described.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO
BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST STEVENSON, REED, COLE:.
PCR FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
If the Appellant's positions with respect to Point I Dand·
Point II above are sustained, then clearly the tortious conduct of
Stevenson, Reed, Cole and PCR is the type of conduct for which, int
words of Nash v. Craig Co., Inc., supra, we ought to "teach the def!:I
dant not to repeat the wrong, and to be a warning to others that sue·'
conduct is not to tolerated."

Such conduct constituted a breach of

fiduciary duty, breach of the duty to act in good faith, constructb
fraud, and the failure to treat Appellant equitably and in accordan~
with good business practices in direct contravention of Rule 19.

C.

RELIEF REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO POINT III

For all the reasons. discussed in this Point III, Appellant
respectfully requests an order of the court remanding this matter~
the purpose of taking evidence to determine the amount of punitive
damages which Appellant is entitled to recover against all Responden~
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the purpose of taking evidence to determine the amount of punitive
damages which Appellant is entitled to recover against all Respondents.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AGAINST
UNIONAMERICA, AND APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO SUCH AWARD
INCLUDING SUCH ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED WITH
RESPECT TO THIS APPEAL
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS FOR
PROSECUTING COUNT I OF THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
1.

I·

The Trial Court's determination.

Count I of the Fourth Amended Complaint simply states a cause
of action against Unionamerica for breach of Unionamerica's agreement
to pay 100% of the Commission to Appellant.

1
' '1

I

1c·

~

1, Judgment, granted

Appellant judgment against Unionamerica, Inc. for the full amount of

1

the Commission, and
their own costs.

~

6, Judgment, stated that the parties should bear

However, the Memorandum Decision and the Trial Court

Findings and the Trial Court Conclusions are silent on the issue of
I~

attorneys' fees and costs.
2.

The uncontested facts.

Pursuant to the Listing, Unionamerica agreed "in case of the
employment of an attorney to enforce this agreement or any rights
arising out of the breach thereof • • . to pay a reasonable attorneys'
o:

fee and all costs of collection."
As was pointed out in Point III A above, prior to trial

n~ Unionamerica knew that its failure to pay 100% of the Commission to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-71-

Appellant was a breach of the Listing, yet Unionamerica wouldn't ev:.
pay Appellant the 40% of the Commission which Unionamerica concedec
all along was owed to Appellant.
3.

The law and its application to the facts.

Appellant concedes that the award of attorneys' fees and
costs and the amount thereof is discretionary with the Trial Court,
However, Appellant contends that the Trial Court abused its discret:
in this instance.

If Appellant's position with respect to either

Point I or Point II sustained, then certainly there would be no
question but what Unionamerica' s failure to pay all of the Commissi:
to Appellant was totally unjustified and Appellant would be entitle!
to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

However, even if the jud:

ment in favor of PCR and against Appellant is not reversed, Appellr
contends that it is entitled to an award of its attorneys' fees and
costs for the reason that Unionamer ica wouldn't even pay 40% of the
Commission to Appellant without this suit.

Further, it was not unt:

after suit was instituted that Unionamerica for the first time deni!
that it owed any part of the Commission to Appellant on the ground

that Appellant had not performed its duties and discharged its obli·
gations pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and the Listing.
Accordingly, Appellant had to present substantial evidence at trial
overcome that denial.

As is clear from ~ 2, Memorandum Decision, I

Trial Court Conclusions and ~ 1, Judgment, the Trial Court ruled
against Unionamerica on that issue in holding that Appellant fullY
performed its obligations.

-72-
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS FOR
PROSECUTING COUNT III OF THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
1.

The Trial Court's determination.

Count III of the Fourth Amended Complaint simply stated a
cause of action against Unionamerica for breach of Unionamerica's
agreement pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and the exclusive
listing contemplated thereby to pay a 6% real estate commission to
Appellant resulting from the sale of the Davis property.

The prayer

following Count III of the Fourth Amended Complaint read as follows:
WHEREFORE, [Appellant] demands judgment ordering
Unionamerica and/or Ramshire to enter into the
Davis Listing with [Appellant] and against Unionamerica and Ramshire, jointly and severally, in an
amount equal to 6% of the purchase price of the
Davis Property as compensatory damages, together
with interest thereon as permitted by law, exemplary damages in an amount appropriate to punish
and set an example of Unionamerica and Ramshire,
for [Appellant's] reasonable attorneys' fee and
costs incurred herein, and for such other and
further relief as the court deems proper in the
premises.
e

After obvious consideration of Count III and the prayer thereof, ! S,
Memorandum Decision, reads as follows: "That plaintiff is entitled to
the relief demanded in Count III of its Fourth Amended Complaint and
is awarded judgment as therein prayed."
Notwithstanding the foregoing specific language of the
Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court Findings and the Trial Court
Conclusions, as pointed out before, are silent on the issue of attorneys'

fees and cos ts.
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2.

The uncontested facts.

In Paragraph 32 of the aforesaid Count III, Appellant ~h
that pursuant to the provisions of the Settlement Agreement had Uni
america acted properly, Unionamerica would have entered into a l~
with respect to the Davis property, which listing would have been[

the same form as the Listing, which form as noted above in Point IV
2, obligated Unionamerica to pay Appellant's attorneys' fees and
costs.

Said Paragraph 32 also alleged that Unionamer ica intentiona

failed to notify Appellant of its intention to sell the Davis

pro~

and intentionally failed to enter into a listing agreement with
respect to the Davis property, all in order to avoid having to pay
Appellant the commission on the sale of the Davis property.
of~

In lig

5, Memorandum Decision, as quoted above, by implication the Tr

Court made findings of fact favorable to Appellant on those issues.
3.

The law and Its Application to the Facts.

Notwithstanding the Trial Court's failure to treat the iss
of attorneys' fees and costs in the Trial Court Findings and the Tr
Court Conclusions, it is obvious from ~ 1, Memorandum Decision, tha
the Trial Court granted Appellant's demand for such an award, and

Appellant contends that the Trial Court's failure to take evidence'

to the amount of such award was an abuse of the Trial Court's discri
tion.

C. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES ANI
COSTS INCURRED WITH RESPECT THIS APPEAL

It is well settled that an award of attorneys fees and cosl

incurred in prosecuting the appeal is discretionary with the supremi
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court.

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment co., 3 Utah 2d

121. 279 P.2d 709 (1955); Bates v. Bates, Utah, 560 P.2d 706 (1977)
and Centurian Corp. v. Kripps, the opinion of the Utah Supreme court
in which case as filed on January 29, 1981 and for which counsel has
no Pacific citation.

D.

RELIEF REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO POINT IV

For all the reasons discussed in this Point IV, Appellant
respectfully requests an order of the court remanding this matter for
the purpose of taking evidence to determine the amount of attorneys'
fees and costs including such attorneys' fees and costs incurred with
respect to prosecuting this appeal, which Appellant is entitled to
recover against Unionamerica.

CONCLUSION

Because PCR was not the procuring cause of the subject sale,
1t

because PCR was not a licensed real estate broker, because PCR had not
filed the required assumed name certificate, and because PCR breached

a'

its fiduciary duty to Appellant, with respect to PCR' s Counterclaim

:e· Appellant is entitled to a judgment in its favor and against PCR, no

cause of action as a matter of law.

In the alternative, because

Unionamerica and Stevenson breached their fiduciary duties to
lD

Appellant and wrongfully and intentionally created a liability against
Appellant, Appellant is entitled to judgment in its favor against

;t:
oe

Unionamerica and Stevenson for compensatory damages in an amount equal
to the amount, if any, awarded to PCR on PCR's Counterclaim.
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Because

of the breaches of contract and/or torts committed by Respondents,
Appellant is entitled to have the matter remanded for

consideratio~

the amount of punitive damages which Appellant is entitled to rec01,
from all Respondents.

Because of Unionamer ica' s breach of contract

Appellant is entitled to have this matter remanded to determine th!
amount of attorneys' fees and costs Appellant is entitled to recove:
from Unionamerica.

In the alternative, Appellant is entitled toa·

trial.
Respectfully Submitted
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUW

i~--<1 -r-=-

'-L.--·s

2-

KENT B LINEBAUGH
370 East South Temple, Suite 401
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801)
532-7700

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of March, 1981, I sm
two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant upon F. S. Prince, Jr
Esq. of Prince, Yeates & Geldzhaler at 425 East 5th South, Third F~
Salt Lake City, UT
Rooker, Larsen
City, UT

&

84111 and Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. of Marti~•

Kimball at 36 South State Street, No. 1800, Salt Li·

84111 or by leaving the same at his office with his clerk

other person in charge thereof.
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
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Kent B Linebaugh
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
79 South State Street
400 Conrnercial Security Bank Building
P. 0. Box 11503
Salt Lake City, Uta:1 84147
Telephone; (801) 532-7700
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: 1LED

DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUl1l'IT, STATE OF UTAH

HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a
Utah corporation, an<l
HAROLD 1-1. TAYLO"..

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs, )
)
)
)

vs.

O:lDER DENYING tfOTION OF
DC!'ENDAHTS' SKYLlllE, REED AND
COLE FOR PARTIAL SUl1!1ARY Jll'"Jl.}!ENT

UNIONAJ.!ETUCA, I!IC. , a cor- )
poration, aka WESTHOR;
) Civil No. 5557
RA!~SHIRE, I:lc. , a corpora- )
tion; WIT.T.TMf R. STEVl·:NSON;)
!'AIU~ CITY i<J;s1·:1tvAT LON~;,
)
INC., a corporation dl"'
)
SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F.
)
REED; and GARY COLE,
)
)

Defendants. )
~~~~~~~~~~->
0 R D E R

This matter hnvinr, come on Eor hearing r>ursuanc co

Notice before the above entitle<l Court on the 2nd <lay o(
April, 1979, Plaintiffs appearing by and through their
counsel of record, Kent B Linebaugh of Jardine. Linebaugh,
llro'm E. Dunn, an<l Defon<lants Skyline, Rce<l an<l Cole
appearing by and throu3h their. co11I1sel of record, Stephen
G. Crockett of Martineau

&

Maak, and l)efendants Union-

america, Ramshire an<l Stevenson appearing by an<l through
their couns<.:l o ( recor<l, DonaJ.<l J. Winder o ( rrincc,
Yeates

&

Geldzahler, the Court having heard the agruments

of counsel an<l considered the relevant memorandum filed in
behalf of Defendants Skyline, Reed and Cole, and being ocherwise fully ~<lvise<l in the premises,

Appendix A
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The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement and the
Listing Agreement contemplate that other parties not invalved in the Lawsuit might find buyers for the

L~stc<l

properties and negotiate a sale therefor, and that neither
Agreement contains any express or implied provision that
Unionamerica or Ramshire would direct any "walk in buyer"
to Plaintiffs.

Such issues are thus now

resolv~J

for all

future proceedings in this case.
But further issues of fact remain to be determined
with respect to Counts V, VI, IX, X and XI and,
IT IS

HE~.EBY

ORDICRED that the Motion of DeCendants

Skyline, Reed and Cole Car Po.rtial Summary Judp,ment oC
Dismissal of saiJ Counts be1nd
DATED this £ d a y

-~s

hereby denieJ.

o~ 1979.

CERTIFICATE OF SER'!ICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Order was served
this ~day of May, 1979 by depositing copies of same
in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid,
addressed to:
Stephen G. Crockett
l~rtineau & Maak
.
Attornevs for Defendants Skyline, Reed and.:
36 So. State, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah
3411L
Donnld J. ~inder
Prince, Yeates & Gcldz~hler

.

Attorneys for Defendants·Unionamerica,
:ind Stevenson

424 s~st 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Kent B Lineh.:iu:",h
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THI:: THIRD .JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Ll AND FOi{ SUl-fr!IT COUllTY, STATE OF UTAH

HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a
L'.t.ah ...:orporat:ion. and

llAROLD W. TAYLOR.

Plo.intiffs,
vs.

~11::~10RA;lQL1'1

:,., i..J:\,\..r.'-:ERICA. I~:c. , a corpo r .:.it: iun, ak<.a ;\CST!-lOR; ~\}iSt-l I RE, I:·!C.
a corpor~tion;
P,\RK CITY RESCRV.-\TIO?TS. INC.,

Dl':CISION

CIVIL NO. 555 7

a corporation, Jb~ SK~LI~IE
Rl:AL:'Y, 11.i\l\l\Y F. l\EE[); and
c;;,r,_y COL!::,
DC fc.:ndancs.

The Court is o( the opinion that the record of this case
..ind thi:

~vide:nce

.:iu?ro:·t.:s t.:hc following findings on che issues

;irc::ienLcd.

1'ho.t
real

e:..>i:..Lt~

2.

P~r~:

C[Ly

Rcs~rvatio11s,

Inc. was a licenseJ

brokl'r at .111 times <n.:i.terial to th~ issues of this case.
H~l

·i·a:1lvr :\ssociaces <lid µcrform all services and dis-

charc~J

all. obl.:...~•H.ions required of it by the Settlel!lent Agreement

.:Jr.J the

Villiag~

J.

Tbe

lisc::.ni_;.
orJ~r

valid and b i.ndinr,
~;ich

of Judg2 Croft entered June 4, 1979, is a

orJ~r

which resolved all issues therein together

all future prucccdi11gs of this case.
4..

l'h.:ic. i.:he St::t:ClL.?mcnc Agreement was

oral az;reemcnl of

S.

ThnL

t:h~

!:!£..£. refoIT.led

by any

parties or mutual mistake of the parcies.

~laindff

is entitled to the relief demanded in

Count III of !.ts Fourth Amended Complaint and is awarded judgmenc
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•
KAL T,\YLOli., ET ,\L
u:IIONAl'J:::\I CA,

6.

!::T AL

That chc claims of plaincii£s on all other

co~~

their fourth .\Ir,t=nc.ie<l CompL:i.int are not ::.;upported by the rtccr:

che evidence anJ the Court finds in favor of the dcfendana

~

against the plaintiffs.
7.

That the real estate como1ission now held in esc:a.

ge cher wi ch all accumuli1-ted inceres c should be divided 40% ,,,,
pl.:iinciffs and

60~~

t.:o lhe defendant Park City

Reservations,:~:

The Court ·,;uuld request chat both counsel for defend"::
_join in preparing anJ submitting findings of Fact,

Co11cl~s~o~s

Law and Judgn1enc consi:>t(!nt with thf;;! foregoing ruling to chc

pursuant co cha rule• of the Third Judicial District Court.

1930.

JAl!ES S. SAWAYA,
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